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INTRODUCTION 
The core idea behind crowdfunding is nothing new – it has been around centuries that people 
pool together their assets in order to fund a common goal or create a common value. The most 
frequently referred example is the pedestal of the Statute of Liberty which was funded by the 
citizens of New York in 1885 after Joseph Pulitzer has published an announcement in the 
magazine “World” asking for a financial contribution for the pedestal of the statute in return 
for publishing each contributors’ name in the newspaper. In five months, the campaign reached 
USD 102,000.1  
Nowadays crowdfunding has made a significant development and gained completely different 
extent and importance as it was when Lady Liberty was sculptured. Today, under the term 
“crowdfunding” is specifically meant an activity of pooling money through internet-based 
platform in small individual contributions from group of people, who are typically not 
professional investors2, in order to support other’s idea and to accomplish a specific goal.3 The 
reason why crowdfunding has gained so much popularity in recent years is mainly the Internet.4 
The global digital revolution has made communication and cooperation between people easier 
than it has ever been before – people can share their ideas with the whole world, despite long 
distances or state borders, and the addressee is able to receive the information just in few 
seconds. 
Crowdfunding may be conducted in different forms, depending on the object of funding and 
whether the individuals participating in the projects receive any profit or benefits. 
Crowdfunding is a very recent phenomenon and academic writing on crowdfunding is referred 
as being nascent or immature.5 The first academic discussions mentioning crowdfunding 
focused on the legal issues under U.S. law, as the United States was the first country where the 
crowdfunding platforms appeared and also the first country where a special regulation for 
crowdfunding was enacted in 2012.6 Just one year after enactment of the Jumpstart Our 
                                                 
1 Franke, N., Dömötör, R., Rütgen-Dömötör, A. The Power of the Crowd, Crowdinvesting für kapitalsuchende 
Unternehmen und Investoren. Junge Wirtschaft Österreich, Vienna: 2014, p. 9.  
2 European Securities and Markets Authority. Opinion. Investment-based crowdfunding. 18 December 2014. 
ESMA/2014/1378, p. 3. 
3 Danmayr, F. Archetypes of Crowdfunding Platforms. A Multidimensional Comparison With a foreword by Dr. 
Othmar Lehner. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014, p. 1.  
4 Brüntje, D., Gajda, O. (editors). Crowdfunding in Europe. State of the Art in Theory and Practice. In association 
with the European Crowdfunding Network. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016, p. 2. 
5 Danmayr, F., p. 2.  
6 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012. 
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Business Startups Act (hereinafter the JOBS Act), the first crowdfunding regulation was 
enacted also in Europe, in Italy. German Retail Investor’s Protection Act 
(Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz)7 came into force on 10 July 2015.  As crowdfunding is not 
specifically regulated in Estonia and the academic discussion is almost absent, the analysis on 
this topic is mainly based on the opinions of EU and international economic and financial 
institutions (ESMA, European Commission, European Central Bank, OECD), as well as 
institutions and financial supervision authorities of other EU Member States and United States. 
As the United States, Italy and Germany were the first countries enacting specific crowdfunding 
regulations and by now in these countries the legal writings and debates on this topic are among 
the most developed, the thesis aims to see these countries as practical examples of different 
regulations for crowdfunding, together with the problems these states have faced so far and the 
opinions of both practitioners and academia. However, it should be noted that even in these 
countries crowdfunding secondary markets are still in process of being established and therefore 
discussions specifically on secondary markets are still immature. 
The first crowdfunding platforms were launched in the United States already in 2005 and 
similar platforms started to appear in Europe in 2010.8 As in 2012 Europe’s crowdfunding 
market was the second largest in the world after North-America, in 2014 Asia has overtaken 
Europe’s position with a small margin.9 In 2012, USD 2.7 billion from about 1.1 million 
campaigns was raised in crowdfunding industry.10 Experts believe that the global crowdfunding 
volume will rise up to USD 35 billion in 2020.11 Investment-based crowdfunding has become 
a promising instrument to overcome start-ups’ early stage equity gap that reduces the new start-
ups’ success and prevents them from fully concentrating on their business activities.12 
Crowdfunding can be a possibility to support the early stage start-ups and strengthen the 
                                                 
7 Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz vom 3. Juli 2015. Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2015 Teil I Nr. 28, ausgegeben zu Bonn 
am 9 Juli 2015. 
8 M. M. Gierczak, U. Bretschneider, P. Haas, I. Blohm, J. M. Leimeister. Crowdfunding: Outlining the New Era 
of Fundraising. – Crowdfunding in Europe. State of the Art in Theory and Practice. In association with the 
European Crowdfunding Network. Edited by Brüntje, D.,  Gajda,O. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 
2016, p. 9. 
9 In 2014, the growth of crowdfunding in Asia was 320 percent which jumped the volume of the total market to 
$3.4 billion, comparing to Europe where the figure was $3.26 billion. Hossain, M., Oparaocha, G., Crowdfunding: 
Motives, Definitions, Typology and Ethical Challenges. Published in Social Science Research Network, October 
15, 2015, p. 6.  
10 Danmayr, F., p. 2. 
11 Gebert, M. et al, Wenzlaff, K. Crowdfunding 2020: Komplement oder Substitut für die Finanzindustrie. BoD – 
Books on Demand, Norderstedt: 2015, p. 10. 
12 Hagedorn, A., Pinkward, A. The Financing Process of Investment-based Crowdfunding: An Empirical Analysis. 
. – Crowdfunding in Europe. State of the Art in Theory and Practice. Brüntje, D., Gajda, O. (editors), in association 
with the European Crowdfunding Network. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016, p. 72.  
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employment and innovation and therefore it has a potential to offer financial growth in modern 
economics.13  It is estimated to become one of the most important ways of financing creative 
projects, start-ups and young companies in 2020.14 
One of the biggest risk for crowdfunding investors investing in start-up companies is the lack 
of liquidity of these investments. It may take many years until the first liquidity events in a 
company. Moreover, dividend payments in young companies is very rare as normally most of 
the return of these companies will be invested in development of the company.  The lack of 
liquidity is considered to be the major challenge for the whole crowdfunding financing as it 
may sabotage the whole concept because investors are not motivated to invest into illiquid 
securities.  
As a reaction to the need of the market, recently several crowdfunding platforms have created 
special secondary trading platforms for crowdfunding investors. These so-called crowdfunding 
secondary markets give young companies a possibility to list their shares or share quotas on 
alternative trading venues. Secondary markets for crowdfunding securities would be a viable 
means for active, liquid and transparent trading of these shares or share quotas. However, until 
now, the topic has mainly been discussed among practitioners and there is still very few 
academic discussion about the potential investor protection risks. 
The aim of this thesis is to find an answer to a question, whether the current company law and/or 
securities law provide for sufficient protection for crowdfunding investors on crowdfunding 
secondary markets and what the sufficient information disclosure on crowdfunding secondary 
market would be. First of all, it will be analysed whether the information disclosure 
requirements that are applicable to regulated markets, would also be applicable to crowdfunding 
secondary markets. Current EU information disclosure regime provides for comprehensive 
information disclosure framework for Member States’ companies whose securities are admitted 
to regulated markets. The disclosure regime has mostly been enacted by maximum 
harmonisation directives and EU regulations that are directly applicable in all Member States. 
Therefore, the freedom of Member States deviate from EU requirements in issuer disclosure 
regime in listed companies is strictly limited. The information disclosure regime under EU law, 
currently in force in Member States, is mainly regulated in in Transparency Directive15, 
                                                 
13 Brüntje, D., Gajda, O., p. 2. 
14 Gebert, M. et al, p. 10.  
15 Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
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Prospectus Directive16 and Prospectus Regulation17, Market Abuse Directive18. Also, MiFID I 
addresses investor protection problem, in particular, by prescribing organisational requirements 
for the marketplaces, by enacting transparency rules and thereby ensuring market integrity, and 
by providing for EU-wide conduct of business regime.19 The recently enacted Market Abuse 
Directive II20 and Market Abuse Regulation21 will enter into force on 3th July 2016 and will 
replace the Market Abuse Regulation. Also, the new MiFID II22 and MiFIR23 regime is 
supposed to enter into force on 3th January 2018. The author analyses whether similar 
information disclosure requirements would apply to crowdfunding secondary markets as it is 
currently applicable to companies whose securities are admitted to regulated markets. If the 
disclosure requirements that are applicable to regulated markets, are not applicable to 
crowdfunding secondary markets, the next question is, whether the company law provides for 
sufficient information disclosure regime for protecting the investors on crowdfunding 
secondary markets or would these investors need higher protection. Assuming that the 
disclosure requirements that apply to regulated markets, would also be applicable to 
crowdfunding secondary markets, it should be analysed whether these disclosure requirements 
would not be excessively burdensome to crowdfunded companies. 
   
The author puts forward two hypotheses:  
1)  if the disclosure requirements that apply to regulated markets, are not applicable to 
crowdfunding secondary markets,  the disclosure requirements under Estonian company law 
are not sufficient to provide adequate protection to crowdfunding investors;  
                                                 
16 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. In 
Estonia, the Prospectus Directive has been implemented into SMA in 2005. 
17 Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation 
by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements. 
18 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse). 
19 Haar, B. Organizing Regional Systems: The EU Example – The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation. 
Moloney, N., Ferran,E., Payne, J. (editors). Oxford University Press, New York: 2015, p. 164. 
20 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse (market abuse directive). 
21 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse 
(market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
22 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID II). 
23 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
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2) if the similar disclosure requirements apply to regulated markets and crowdfunding 
secondary markets, these regulations would be excessively burdensome for crowdfunded 
companies. 
Therefore, crowdfunding secondary markets would need a specific regulatory regime that 
would provide for higher information disclosure requirements than is provided under the 
company law, but would be less requiring than the regime for the companies admitted to 
regulated markets. 
In order to test the abovementioned hypotheses, it should be first defined what the investment-
based crowdfunding is, who are the participants of the funding rounds and what will be the 
legal status of crowdfunding investors in such companies. The protection of investors in 
secondary markets is highly dependent on the investor protection measures taken on primary 
market, therefore, the need for such specific regulations should be analysed. The EU law does 
not provide any specific harmonised legal framework for crowdfunding and the regulation is 
highly fragmented in different European countries. Some of the Member States have enacted 
comprehensive crowdfunding legal framework whereas in many other states crowdfunding 
remains fully unregulated. As Estonia belongs to the second group of the countries, the legal 
framework of crowdfunding in two other European countries – Italy and Germany – where a 
specific legal framework have been introduced, as well the birthplace of the crowdfunding 
regulations – the United States of America – are compared, and analysed whether Estonia would 
need to take an initiative to regulate investment-based crowdfunding in order to protect retail 
investors and/or facilitate the capital raising for young companies. 
Second, in order to analyse whether crowdfunding secondary markets would be subject to 
similar information disclosure requirements as regulated markets, it should be first defined what 
crowdfunding secondary markets are, how these markets could be structured and what would 
be applicable regulations for such secondary market structures. In the first chapter, the author 
analyses the structures of the potential crowdfunding secondary markets as well as the 
admissibility of crowdfunding securities on different trading venues as well as trading over-
the-counter and the possible regulatory and disclosure regime that would apply. 
For testing the first hypothesis, the author analyses the core objectives of disclosure 
requirements on regulated markets in order to determine whether these objectives are similar in 
crowdfunding secondary markets. It will then be analysed whether the information disclosure 
requirements for non-listed companies under company law would be sufficient to achieve these 
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objectives in crowdfunding secondary markets or should the more stringent disclosure 
requirements, as applicable to regulated markets, apply. 
The testing of the second hypothesis requires analysis of the proportionality of information 
disclosure requirements on crowdfunding secondary markets. The most important question 
concerning information disclosure on crowdfunding secondary markets is, whether the 
information disclosure requirements should be prescribed and guaranteed by a state or whether 
the information disclosure could be regulated by free market forces. If the information 
disclosure requirements are imposed by a state, the question is, what the limitations of the 
disclosure requirements under the principle of proportionality are. In other words, what the 
fundamental rights of a company that would be limited due to mandatory information disclosure 
are, and from the other side, what the justifications for these limitations on crowdfunding 
secondary markets would be. 
From one side it is important that the potential advantages that crowdfunding would give to 
young companies would not be eliminated by excessively rigid administrative and information 
disclosure requirements imposed by a state. From the other side, despite all benefits that 
supporting financing young start-ups would give to our economy, the most important role of a 
state is to assure that investors participating in such fundings are adequately protected and that 
these markets are functioning honestly without fraudulent activities and exploitation of retail 
investors.  With a speech at the SEC’s and Rock Center’s Silicon Valley Initiative, Chair Mary 
Jo White has expressed her concern of the problems regarding the risks of fraudulent activities 
in pre-IPO stock markets and how important it is that the regulators would take into account 
the technological changes and react quickly to the possible risks it may entail. Chair Mary Jo 
White referred to the problems of the technology-focused IPOs that enabled early staged 
employees to sell their stock to outside investors, in particular, unregistered broker-dealer 
activities, conflicts of interest and undisclosed compensation as well as fraudulent offers of 
pooled investment vehicles that purported to hold the pre-IPO stock. These issues were 
stemmed partly due to insufficient disclosure to the secondary market investors. These investors 
did not have an access to accurate information concerning the value of the companies where 
they were investing.24As the success of primary crowdfunding market depends on the 
                                                 
24 Chair Mary Jo White. Speech. Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon 
Valley Initiative. 31.03.2016. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-
initiative-3-31-16.html#_ftn16. 
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functioning of secondary markets, it may undermine the potential that crowdfunding would 
give for financing young start-ups and consequently to economy as a whole.  
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1. THE CONCEPT OF INVESTMENT-BASED CROWDFUNDING: PRIMARY 
AND SECONDARY MARKETS 
1.1. Defining the concept of primary market of investment-based 
crowdfunding 
Investment-based crowdfunding is a very new research area for academics and thus there is a 
widespread confusion and discordance in the use of terminology. Although in many languages, 
the borrowed English terms, such as crowdinvesting, equity-based crowdfunding, investment-
based crowdfunding or crowdsourcing are used more often than the corresponding terms in 
these languages, terms are not always uniformly used among practitioners. In German-speaking 
countries, the term crowdinvesting is often used to distinguish crowdfunding based on the 
investments from other forms of crowdfunding.25 Crowdinvesting is considered to be a sub-
category of crowdfunding26. ESMA, however, has adopted the term investment-based 
crowdfunding.27  
Crowdfunding has been defined as “an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision 
of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some 
form of reward to support initiatives for specific purposes.”28 Crowdfunding is a form of 
financing that uses internal financing rather than traditional sources of external financing (e.g., 
bank loan, angel capital, venture capital).29 Traditionally, banks have been acting as 
intermediaries between those who have and those who need money, but crowdfunding brings 
these people together directly, making it easier and cheaper for companies to collect capital 
                                                 
25 Moritz, A., Block, J. H. Crowdfunding: A Literature Review and Research Directions – Crowdfunding in 
Europe. State of the Art in Theory and Practice. Brüntje, D., Gajda, O. (editors), in association with the European 
Crowdfunding Network. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016, p. 25. 
26 Klöhn, L., Hornuf, L. (2012). Investment-based Crowdfunding in Deutschland. Zeitschrift für. Bankrecht und 
Bankwirtschaft: ZBB, 24(4), p. 239. 
27 E.g. see European Securities and Markets Authority. Opinion. Investment-based crowdfunding. 18 December 
2014. ESMA/2014/1378. Available online: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-
1378_opinion_on_investment-based_crowdfunding.pdf;  European Securities and Markets Authority. Investment-
based crowdfunding. Insights from regulators in the EU. 13 May 2015, ESMA/2015/856 Ann 1. 
Available online: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/esma-2015-
856_ann_1_esma_response_to_ec_green_paper_on_cmu_-_crowdfunding_survey.pdf. In this thesis, also the 
term investment-based crowdfunding (as a synonym of equity-based crowdfunding and crowdinvesting) is used. 
28 Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T., Schwienbacher, A. Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd. Journal of Business 
Venturing. July 9, 2013, p. 8. 
29 Ibid., p. 11.  
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through Internet based platforms and giving the customers a possibility to invest even small 
amounts of money directly in projects or companies. Crowdfunding is a collective effort by 
people networking and pooling their money together in order to invest in and support efforts 
initiated by other people or organisations.30 Therefore, the main idea of crowdfunding is to 
make investing simple to big amount of customers, so that through collecting small 
contributions from each individual would be possible to create a common goal. 
The term crowdfunding may mean several different types of money collecting activities, 
whereby the type of crowdfunding depends on the benefits that investors receive for their 
contribution. Mainly four different types of crowdfunding can be distinguished:  donation-
based, reward-based, lending-based and investment-based crowdfunding.31  Donation-based 
crowdfunding is based on the idea that a group of people finance a certain project with small 
contributions and without expecting to receive any benefits. The idea of donation-based 
crowdfunding has been extensively used by churches for many centuries who have collected 
small contributions from individuals. Reward-based crowdfunding is similar to donation-based 
crowdfunding, except for the small prize (e.g. concert tickets, pens, discounts, membership 
cards etc.) that the contributors will receive in case the project will be successful. The main 
motive of the individuals investing in these projects is usually not receiving profit but 
supporting the idea of the campaigner.   
Crowdfunding can also be structured in a way that gives the investors possibility to receive 
some return from the money invested. Generally, there are two kinds of platforms that are based 
on a financial return of the investors: lending-based and investment-based crowdfunding 
platforms.  Lending-based crowdfunding itself may also have several different business 
structures. For example, in Estonia there are currently so-called peer to peer lending platforms,32 
which allow the individuals to give loans to individual borrowers, and real estate crowdfunding 
platforms33 through which the individuals are giving loans for financing real estate projects. 
The research problems discussed in this thesis are, however, limited only to the financial return 
based crowdfunding business, i.e. investment-based crowdfunding. 
                                                 
30 Ordanini, A., Miceli, L., Pizzetti, M. Crowd-funding: transforming customers into investors through innovative 
service platforms (2011). Journal of Service Management, Vol. 22 Iss 4, p. 444. 
31 Klöhn, L.,  Hornuf, L., p. 239. 
32 See for example Bondora, https://www.bondora.ee/newborrowerconversation/index2/?utm_expid=83917422-
32.lUe_b4j9Rt2P0b7vpQBsNw.1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bondora.ee%2Finvesteeri%2Finveste
erimisjuhis. 
33 See for example EstateGuru, https://estateguru.eu/. 
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The main motive of the individuals to invest their money through investment-based 
crowdfunding platforms is to receive financial return. In case of investment-based 
crowdfunding, the contributors receive private equity in the financed companies if the project 
will be successful.  Therefore, investment-based crowdfunding is a method of collecting small 
contributions from many individuals through internet based platform in order to finance or 
capitalise an enterprise. 
Three different players in investment-based crowdfunding models can be identified: the project 
owner, the crowdfunding platform and the “crowd”. The project owner is a company (usually 
a start-up company)34 launching a project and searching for financial contributions from 
interested supporters and issuing  shares or share quotas, depending on the legal form of the 
company, that the contributors will receive for their investments. The project owner designs a 
campaign and calls for capital through special platform designed to advertise such projects 
(crowdfunding platform). The crowdfunding platform is an Internet based platform which is 
acting as an intermediary between the project owner and the crowd. The project owner designs 
and proposes it to be published on crowdfunding platform’s website. The crowdfunding 
platform publishes the information about the campaign and plays a matchmaking role between 
the issuer and the investors making small contributions for the proposed project. The platform 
usually does not provide any assistance concerning the investments in the companies and all 
the agreements with the companies are concluded on investors own risk. In case of successful 
campaign, the funds are transferred to the target company and the investors will become 
shareholders of the company. Should the campaign fail, the funds will be transferred back to 
the investors from the escrow account. The “crowd” is defined as a group of people (investors) 
who are giving financial contributions to support the idea of the project owner. In return to their 
investment, the contributors are promised to receive shares or share quotas in the established 
company. The contributors are generally consumers (retail investors) and the investments are 
rather small. For example, in Estonia, the minimum investment amounts on investment-based 
crowdfunding are EUR 100-200, although, under current legal framework there are no 
minimum or maximum investment limits for the individuals to invest in such projects; 
 
                                                 
34 In Estonia, all types of companies can be funded through crowdfunding as there is no specific regulation 
restricting it but for example in Italy previously only „innovative start-ups“ were allowed to seek funding through 
investment-based crowdfunding. 
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1.2. The need for specific regulatory regime for primary markets of 
investment-based crowdfunding 
Investment-based crowdfunding is not explicitly regulated in Estonia. Currently investment-
based crowdfunding platforms are not required to hold any activity license and they are not 
supervised by Estonian Financial Supervision Authority. However, if a crowdfunding platform 
would provide any payment services that are provided under § 3 of it Payment Institutions and 
E-money Institutions Act (hereinafter PIEIA), it could qualify as payment institution35 which 
could operate only as a public limited company (PIEIA § 5 (1)) and would need a payment 
services provider’s licence from Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (PIEIA § 14). 
Moreover, if the platform would receive money from public for the purposes of depositing 
which would require banking activity licence. When a crowdfunding portal is solely 
intermediating funding the companies through online platform and holding the deposits on an 
account of a third party, license requirement does not apply.  
The emergence of investment-based crowdfunding platforms in Estonia raises doubts whether 
the existing legal framework is sufficient to provide adequate protection to retail investors and 
transparency in such investment business and whether Estonian legislator should address the 
issue by bringing these platforms under the direct supervision of Estonian Financial Supervision 
Authority and/or taking additional consumer protection measures for crowdfunding investors. 
In fact, this problem has been addressed by many other countries (e.g. Italy, Germany and 
United States) where special regulations have been enacted in order to facilitate the capital 
raising through crowdfunding platforms and at the same time provide adequate protection to 
crowdfunding investors.  
First country where crowdfunding was regulated was Unites States, where the JOBS Act was 
signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 5th 2012.36 The aim of the act was to easy 
the regulatory burden of small companies when issuing securities.37 Title III of the JOBS Act 
(the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012) 
regulates specifically the crowdfunding business. The JOBS Act allows individuals to invest in 
start-ups, emerging businesses, and small issuers online by purchasing equity securities in 
crowdfunded companies via SEC registered crowdfunding portals. The answer to the question 
                                                 
35 The company would be qualified as payment institution if its permanent activity is providing payment services.  
36 See: https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobs-act.shtml.  
37 Newman, N. Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A’s Futility before and after the J.O.B.S. Act. U. 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law. P. 65. 
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whether crowdfunding investments are securities subject to the Securities Act registration 
requirements, depends on the particular form of crowdfunding38 and thus must be evaluated by 
case to case basis. 
The JOBS Act legalised investment-based crowdfunding in the United States by creating a new 
registration exemption that allows certain issuers raise up to USD 1 million in twelve month 
period.39 In addition, the contribution amount of each individual investor shall not exceed (i) 
the greater of USD 2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth of the investor, 
provided that either the annual income or net worth of the investor is less than USD 100,000; 
and (ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of an investor, not to exceed a total amount 
sold of USD 100,000, if either the annual income or net worth is equal or more than 
USD 100,000.40 Moreover, the transaction can be conducted only through a broker or funding 
portal that complies with the requirements of section in 4A(a) of the same act41 and the issuer 
has to comply with the requirements set forth in section 4A(b).42 
A person acting as an intermediary has to provide such disclosures, including disclosures related 
to risks and other investor education materials, as the Commission determines appropriate.43 
The intermediary has to ensure that the investor reviews or investor-education information 
positively affirms that the investor understands that the possible risk of losing the entire 
investment, and that the investor could bear such a loss. The investor has to answer certain 
questions demonstrating an understanding of the level of risk generally applicable to 
investments in start-ups, emerging businesses, and small issuers, an understanding of the risk 
of illiquidity and other matters as the Commission determines appropriate.44 The intermediary 
has to take measures to reduce the risk of fraud with respect to such transactions, including 
obtaining a background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, 
director, and person holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer 
whose securities are offered by such person.45 
                                                 
38 Bradford, C. Steven. Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws. Columbia Business Law Review. Vol 
2012. P. 8.  
39 JOBS Act Sec. 302(a)(6)(A) 
40 JOBS Act Sec. 302(a)(6)(B)  
41 JOBS Act Sec. 302(a)(6)(C). 
42 JOBS Act Sec. 302(a)(6)(D). 
43 JOBS Act Sec. 4A (a)(3) 
44 JOBS Act Sec. 4A(a)(4) 
45 JOBS Act Sec. 4A(a)(5) 
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Not later than 21 days prior to the first day on which securities are sold to any investor, the 
intermediary has to make available to the Commission and to potential investors any 
information provided that the issuer is obliged to make available.46 Section 4A(b) provides for 
a list of information that the issuer has to file with the Commission and to make available  to 
potential investors. This information includes, inter alia, name, legal status, physical address, 
and website address of the issuer47, a description of the business and the anticipated business 
plan48, a description of the financial condition49, a description of the stated purpose and intended 
use of the proceeds of the offering50, the target offering amount, with the deadline to reach that 
amount51, the price to the public of the securities or the method for determining the price52, a 
description of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer53.   
The description of the ownership must include also the terms of the securities of the issuer being 
offered and each other class of security of the issuer, and a summary of the differences between 
such securities54. The issuer has to make available a description of how the exercise of the rights 
held by the principal shareholders of the issuer could negatively impact the purchasers of the 
securities being offered, the name and ownership level of each existing shareholder who owns 
more than 20 percent of any class of the securities and how the securities being offered are 
being valued (with examples of methods for how such securities may be valued by the issuer 
in the future). The risks to purchasers of the securities relating to minority ownership in the 
issuer and the risks associated with corporate actions, including additional issuances of shares, 
a sale of the issuer or of assets of the issuer, or transactions with related parties, must be 
described.55 
                                                 
46 JOBS Act Sec. 4A(a)(6) 
47 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(A) 
48 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(B) 
49 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(C). According to the amounts of the offerings within the preceding 12-month period, the 
following documents shall be made available (i) $ 100,000 or less, the income tax returns filed by the issuer for 
the most recently completed year (if any) and financial statements of the issuer, which shall be certified by the 
principal executive officer of the issuer; (ii) more than $100,000, but not more than $500,000, financial statements 
reviewed by a public accountant who is independent of the issuer, using professional standards and procedures for 
such review or standards and procedures established by the Commission, and (iii) more than $500,000, audited 
financial statements. 
50 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(D) 
51 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(E) 
52 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(F). Before the final sale, each investor shall be provided in writing the final price and all 
required disclosures, with a reasonable opportunity to rescind the commitment to purchase the securities. 
53 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(G).  
54 This must include an explanation how the rights of the securities being offered may be materially limited, diluted, 
or qualified by the rights of any other class of security of the issuer. 
55 JOBS Act Sec. 4B(1)(H)(i-v). 
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In Europe, the first country regulating crowdfunding was Italy, where the crowdfunding 
regulation has been adopted in 2013 with the CONSOB Regulation No. 18592/2013,56 which 
implements sections 50-quinquies (“Management of portals for raising capital for innovative 
start-ups”) and 100-ter (“Offers through portals for raising capital”) of the legislative decree 
58/1998 of Italian Consolidated Act of Finance, which has been introduced by law decree 
179/2012. Banks and investment firms are allowed to manage crowdfunding portals in Italy, 
whereas crowdfunding portal managers must hold a specific license that is granted only when 
the portal manager fulfils all the following prerequisites: a) the portal manager is a private or 
public limited company or cooperative company; b) it is an Italian based company or an 
European Union company that has established a branch in Italy; c) the scope of the portal 
manager is managing of crowdfunding portals; d) the owners and the management of the 
company fulfils the special requirements provided by the regulation. Moreover, the company 
running crowdfunding portal is entered in a special registry which is managed by the CONSOB.  
As regards investor protection, the crowdfunding regulation provides for a different protection 
regime for retail investors, which depends on the amount they wish to invest in the project in 
question. An exemption from MiFID I applies if a natural person invests less than EUR 500 in 
relation to each order or less than EUR 1.000 in relation to total amount of orders placed on a 
yearly basis. With regard to legal entities, the relevant thresholds are EUR 5.000 and EUR 
10.000 respectively. Such measures are aimed to protect retail investors and to reduce the 
obligations of intermediaries.  
Another unique requirement in Italy is that at least 5% of the financial instruments object of the 
offer must be subscribed by professional investors or banking foundations or incubators of 
innovative start-ups. It is, however, not a prerequisite for participating in crowdfunding, but a 
requisite for the completion thereof. In Italy, the prospectus requirement does not apply to the 
offering of securities with a value of less than EUR 5 million which is also the maximum limit 
under European law that the Member States may enact. According to that limit crowdfunding 
regulation allows to raise funds up to EUR 5 million per single offer in 12-month period. The 
threshold is considerably high comparing the USD 1 million in United States or even EUR 2.5 
million in Germany. 
                                                 
56 Regolamento CONSOB  n. 18592 sulla raccolta di capitali di rischio da parte di start-up innovative tramite 
portali on-line [Regulation CONSOB no. 18592 on raising capital from innovative start-ups through online 
portals]. 
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The first Italian crowdfunding regulation was criticized by practitioners because it established 
too strict limits for the enterprises who were allowed to raise money through crowdfunding. 
Namely, the regulation allowed only “innovative start-ups” to participate in crowdfunding 
financing rounds. The company must have been involved in the development, production or 
sale of innovative products or services having a high technological value and the company may 
not have been operational for more than 48 months. As a result, the crowdfunding regulation in 
Italy was subsequently amended by legislative decree 33/2015, whereas the new provisions 
refer to “offering subjects” (and not “issuers”), this way including in the definition also other 
companies, such as innovative SMEs, OICRs (investment funds). 
Few years after the crowdfunding regulations were enacted in United States and in Italy, 
Germany adopted a special Retail Investors Protection Act (Kleinenlagerschutzgesetz),57 which 
came into force on 10th July 2015. The legislator introduced so-called crowdfunding exception, 
which excludes crowdfunding from several requirements of the German Capital Investment 
Law (Vermögensanlagengesetz)58, for example form prospectus requirement when the project 
does not exceed the threshold of EUR 2.5 million. The Retail Investors Protection Act applies 
only when offering profit participating loans, subordinated loans or commercially comparable 
investments. The total investment amount per each investor is limited to EUR 10,000. However, 
if the investment exceeds a threshold of EUR 1,000 investor must comply with further 
requirements, such as self-exploration on wealth or income. The maximum investment limit is 
not applicable to corporations. Any crowdfunding platform operating in Germany must hold a 
license under German Trade, Commerce and Industry Regulation Act (Gewerbeordnung)59, 
under the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz)60 or the German Securities Trading Act 
(Weltpapierhandelsgesetz)61. 
The objectives of the special crowdfunding regulations in all three countries have been two-
sided. First, the crowdfunding regulations provide higher consumer protection by establishing 
certain wealth thresholds for investors, regulating the maximum investment amounts and 
                                                 
57 Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz vom 3. Juli 2015. Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2015 Teil I Nr. 28, ausgegeben zu Bonn 
am 9 Juli 2015. 
58 Vermögensanlagengesetz vom 6. Dezember 2011 (BGBl. I S. 2481), das zuletzt durch Artikel 4 des Gesetzes 
vom 22. Dezember 2015 (BGBl. I S. 2565) geändert worden ist. 
59 Gewerbeordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 22. Februar 1999 (BGBl. I S. 202), die durch Artikel 
10 des Gesetzes vom 11. März 2016 (BGBl. I S. 396) geändert worden ist. 
60 Kreditwesengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl. I S. 2776), das durch 
Artikel 12 des Gesetzes vom 11. März 2016 (BGBl. I S. 396) geändert worden ist. 
61 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl. I S. 2708), das 
durch Artikel 6 des Gesetzes vom 31. März 2016 (BGBl. I S. 518) geändert worden ist. 
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providing for very specific information disclosure requirements to issuers in order to be allowed 
to raise money from retail investors. From the other side, the regulations also facilitate money 
raising through crowdfunding online platforms. In United States the JOBS Act legalised 
crowdfunding business and made it possible for the retail investors to participate in such 
investment campaigns. Also in Europe, for example in Germany, the crowdfunding regulation 
made exemptions for the issuers from the prospectus requirement and in Italy crowdfunding 
business was legalised by giving the permission for banks and investment firms to manage such 
portals. In addition to investor protection and simplified regulations for crowdfunding portals 
to facilitate raising money, there is another important positive development that the special 
crowdfunding regulation has created – it is the legal clarity.  
In Estonia, the current legal framework does not establish any significant obstacles for raising 
money through crowdfunding portals. In contrary, the investment-based crowdfunding is not 
under supervision of Estonian Financial Supervision Authority. The online platforms are not 
required to hold any licence and no special prerequisites are established for such portal 
operators. Moreover, there are no special protection measures, such as investment limits or 
wealth-based investment allowance or special risk warning requirements,62 established for retail 
investors and therefore the possibility for frauds and wrong assessment of risks by non-
experienced investors are high. Besides, current legal uncertainty is a major obstacle for 
development of crowdfunding business and especially it is a barrier for foreign crowdfunding 
platforms providing cross-border services or establishing a branch in Estonia. As in above-
described countries and many other countries in Europe and outside, Estonia needs to take the 
initiative to reassess the current legal framework in the light of the changed reality that 
crowdfunding has caused and find the reasonable compromise between the need for retail 
investor protection and the objective to encourage the growth of start-ups businesses through 
investment-based crowdfunding in Estonia.  
 
1.3. Defining the concept of crowdfunding secondary market 
Secondary market means a market where securities are traded after being initially offered to the 
public in the primary market. When in a primary market securities are offered for subscription 
                                                 
62 The risks include, inter alia, the risk of illiquidity, the absence of secondary market, restrictions of an investor 
to cancel the investment, the risk of not getting the expected performance, risk of not being able to influence the 
management of the issuer and risk of dilution. The Board of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions. Crowdfunding 2015 Survey Responses Report. FR/2015, December 2015, p. 19. 
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for the purpose of raising capital, in the secondary market, these existing securities are traded 
among investors, and in principle, the secondary market operates independently from the issuer 
of the securities.63 The distinction between primary and secondary markets is fundamental for 
companies. On the primary market “new” financial products are created and a company can 
obtain new financial resources. The secondary market is a market for “used” financial product, 
where the previously issued securities are simply changing hands, without any new securities 
created. The purpose of the secondary market is to ensure that the securities are properly priced 
and traded and thereby facilitating the purchase or sale of these securities, i.e. providing 
liquidity. 64 In investment-based crowdfunding business, the new issues market, i.e. the initial 
funding rounds where individuals are supporting an established start-up, is primary market, and 
the market where subsequent trading with these securities takes place, is secondary market.  
Many states have already enacted primary market regulation for investment-based 
crowdfunding and the issues are actively debated among legal scholars and practitioners around 
the world. However, the most recent development in crowdfunding is the emergence of 
secondary market trading systems. Inherent lack of liquidity is considered to be one of the 
biggest risks when investing in start-ups and small businesses through crowdfunding. As the 
crowdfunding industry continues to grow, the need for effective secondary market becomes 
more important and many crowdfunding platforms are currently developing new technology 
and business structures to give their clients a possibility for secondary trading and thereby also 
help to develop the primary market. 
The quality of primary market for securities depends greatly on the quality of secondary 
market.65 There would be few incentive to buy a financial security on primary market, knowing 
that it would be impossible or even very difficult to sell it on secondary market. Moreover, the 
secondary market determines the price in which the company can issue its securities on primary 
market as investors would be deciding between the existing investments and new proposed 
investments.66 The same applies to contributors in crowdfunding who invest their money into 
young companies in order to gain financial return. Without a secondary market these securities 
would be highly illiquid and would not provide any expected financial return to the investors.  
                                                 
63 Vernimmen, P. et al. Corporate Finance. Theory and Practice. Forth Edition. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, Great 
Britain: 2014, p. 538. 
64 Liquidity means the ability to convert an investment into cash quickly and without loss of value. An investment 
is liquid when an investor can buy and sell it in large quantities without causing a change in its price. See 
Vernimmen, P. et al. p, 538. 
65 Ibid., p. 8. 
66 Ibid.. 
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1.4. Exchange trading venues for crowdfunded securities 
Generally, there are two ways how to organise secondary markets: trading on an exchange 
venue or trading over-the-counter. Unlike over-the-counter trade, the exchanges have a 
“place”67 and the institutional rules that govern the trading and they are usually more formal.  
The most important trading venue is regulated market, which is a market where the government 
controls the forces of supply and demand and the requirements to access to the market and the 
market prices.  Regulated market is a multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market 
operator, which brings together or facilitates bringing together of multiple third-party buying 
and selling interests in financial instruments (in the system and in accordance with its non-
discretionary rules) in a way that results in a contract, in respect of the financial instruments 
admitted to trading under its rules and/or systems, and which is authorised and functions 
regularly and in accordance with Title III of MiFID II/MiFIR rules for regulated markets.68 In 
Estonia, the only regulated secondary securities market is NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Stock 
Exchange.  
Considering that the companies funded through investment-based crowdfunding platforms are 
usually young companies or start-ups, going public will not be near-future option for these 
enterprises, as they must meet specific quantitative admission requirements (e.g. free float, 
capitalisation, operating history, market cap)69 and the costs of complying with regulatory 
requirements can be very high. Therefore, generally crowdfunded securities cannot be traded 
on regulated markets until the company has reached a certain size and development. As this is 
usually a process that takes many years and as only few of the crowdfunding companies are 
ever able to achieve such success, this may not provide enough liquidity for the crowdfunding 
investors who would like to exit the investments before. Because of that, the portals are 
developing new alternative trading options for crowdfunding investors. 
                                                 
67 The “place” is not only physical location of the trade. Nowadays most of the trading exchanges are becoming 
electronic. 
68 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID II). Article 4(1)(21). 
69 For example, to be eligible for inclusion to the Main List of Tallinn Stock Exchange, a company must have three 
years of operating history an established financial position, market cap of not less than EUR 4 million, with 
reporting according to the International Financial Reporting Standards, and a free float of 25% or worth at least 
EUR 10 million. See http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/en/products-services/trading-2/market-structure/.  
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Another possibility how to organise secondary market for young crowdfunding companies 
would be using alternative trading venues. MiFID I had great impact in market structure in 
Europe by abolishing the concentration rule and allowing other trading platforms to compete 
with the traditional stock exchanges (regulated markets). MiFID I created an additional trading 
venue, i.e. multilateral trading facility (hereinafter MTF),70 and MiFID II/MiFIR adopted 
Organised Trading Facility (hereinafter OTF).71 However, the OTF cannot support trading in 
equity or equity-like securities.72 The main motivations not to use OTF in equity segment for 
equity was that OTF would have potentially prejudiced price formation because of the 
potentially poor quality of the transparency data such as OTF as a discretionary venue73 could 
produce. By limiting the operation of OTF to non-equity instruments, many risks were avoided. 
As regulated markets and MTFs are non-discretionary, such problem was not seen to be existing 
there. 
Several crowdfunding secondary markets that have established very recently, are using MTF 
platforms.74  MTF is defined as a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a 
market operator, which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests in 
financial instruments (in the system and in accordance with non-discretionary rules) in a way 
that results in a contract.75 Under MiFID I, regulated markets are distinguished from other 
multilateral trading platforms by the distinct regime which applies to the admission of securities 
to trading on a regulated market and the extensive disclosure regime that is not applicable to 
any other trading venues. The MiFID I pre- and post-trade transparency regime applies to shares 
                                                 
70 Alexander, K. Market Structures and Market Abuse. – Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability: 
Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Theories and Models. Caprio, G, Jr. (editor-in-chef). Elsevier Inc., United 
States of America: 2013, p. 383.  
71 OTF is a multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an MTF and in which multiple third-party buying 
and selling interests in bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances or derivatives are able to interact 
in the system in a way that results in a contract.  Examples of OTFs would include broker crossing systems and 
inter-dealer broker systems bringing together third-party interests and orders by way of voice and/or hybrid voice 
or electronic execution. European Commission. Public Consultation, Review of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), 08.12.2010, p 9; Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU (MiFID II). 
72 Mills, A., Haines, P. Essential strategies for Financial Services Compliance. Second Edition. John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, Great Britain: 2015, p. 352; 10. Moloney, N.. EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation. 3rd Edition. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2014, p. 464. 
73 Discretion in OTF operates in two levels: when deciding to place an order in OTF and to react the order and 
when not deciding to match a client order with other orders in the system at the time, as long as it compiles with 
best execution requirements (MiFID II Art. 20(6)). Moloney, N.. EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation. 
3rd Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2014, p. 465. 
74 E.g. see www.alternativa.fr; www.euronext.com.  
75 Directive 2014/65/EU, preamble (22). 
22 
 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and covers trading of such shares whether it takes 
place on a regulated market or on  an MTF. However, the regime does not apply if an instrument 
is admitted only to trading on a MTF and has not been admitted to trading on regulated market. 
European Commission has expressed its concern that the MiFID I transparency framework for 
the securities traded outside regulated market was not sufficient and more specific pre- and 
post-trade transparency rules should be applied when the securities are only traded on MTFs.76 
Moreover, it has been argued that MTFs have a competitive advantage comparing to regulated 
markets because the MTFs do not set prices or provide market-making facilities and are not 
required under EU law to maintain market abuse surveillance system and therefore the MTFs 
operate on the basis of lower operating and regulatory compliance costs.77 Addressing this 
issue, MiFID II/MiFIR regime aims to align the regulatory standards for these two trading 
venues through pre- and port-trade transparency requirements.78 Under MiFID II, the usual 
authorisation process (e.g. firm governance, qualifying investors, and initial capital) applies to 
an investment firm (or market operator) seeking to operate as an MTF.79 Market operators and 
investment firms operating an MTF must make public current bid and offer prices, and the depth 
of trading interest at those prices that are advertised through these systems. As regards post-
trade transparency, the price, volume and time of transactions executed must be made public.80 
Also, the national competent authority (in Estonia, Financial Supervision Authority) must be 
provided with a detailed description of the functioning of the MTF and every authorisation to 
an investment firm or market operator to operate an MTF must be also notified to ESMA, which 
must establish a list of MTFs in the EU. Therefore, under the new regime, regulated markets 
and MTFs will be subject to very similar disclosure rules.  
The main reasons why the disclosure regime was extended to alternative trading venues were 
mainly to create more robust and efficient market structures, increase transparency and stronger 
investor protection similarly on all trading venues. From one side, the new regime provides for 
higher consumer protection and helps to avoid fraudulent activities on these financial markets, 
but from the other side, it may be argued that the new regime will indirectly introduce again the 
                                                 
76 European Commission. Public Consultation, Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
08.12.2010, p. 26.  
77 Alexander, K. Market Structures and Market Abuse. – Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability: 
Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Theories and Models. Caprio, G, Jr. (editor-in-chef). Elsevier Inc., United 
States of America: 2013, p. 388. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Moloney, N. EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation. 3rd Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2014, p. 475. 
80 Gullifer, L. Payne, J., p. 541. 
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concentration rule in EU capital markets as the trading even in alternative venues will be subject 
to similar requirements as on regulated markets. Under MiFID II/MiFIR equities subject to the 
trading obligation will no longer be able to trade on broker crossing networks but instead, all 
business will need to move to regulated markets (MiFID II Title III), MTFs or systematic 
internalisers (MiFID II Title II, the investment firm regime) or equivalent third country venues. 
This may be excessively costly and burdensome for crowdfunding secondary markets, which 
may make the crowdfunding platforms seek for different structures for organising the secondary 
market trading. Most importantly, these securities may be traded on over-the-counter markets. 
 
1.5. Over-the-counter trading of crowdfunded securities 
Over-the-counter trade would be another possible way how to organise crowdfunding 
secondary markets. MiFID II/MiFIR (as MiFID I) regime does not provide a comprehensive 
definition of over-the-counter trade.81 Over-the-counter trade relates to transactions that are 
ad hoc and irregular and are carried out with wholesale counterparties. Over-the-counter 
transactions are carried out outside regulated markets or other trading venues and it can take 
various shapes from bilateral trading to permanent structures, such as systematic internalisers. 
In an over-the-counter market, dealers act as market makers by quoting prices at which the 
securities will be sold or bought. The trade in over-the-counter market may be executed between 
two participants and the prices may not be disclosed to other parties. Therefore, over-the-
counter trade is considered to be less transparent than exchanges. 
When an investment firm deals on its own account when executing client orders outside a 
regulated market, an MTF or an OTF without operating a multilateral system, it falls under the 
regulation of systematic internaliser82 which is defined under Article 4(1)(20) of MiFID II. 
When an investment firm is a systematic internaliser, it has to notify the national competent 
authorities of its systematic internaliser status and ESMA is maintaining a list of systematic 
internalisers in Europe (MiFIR Art. 15(1)). MiFIR changes the current regime regarding 
systematic internalisers by adding the pre-trade transparency requirements. Any order 
                                                 
81 The European Parliament proposed a definition of over-the-counter which was limited to bilateral trading carried 
out by an eligible counterparty on its own account, outside of a trading venue or an SI, on an occasional and 
irregular basis, with eligible counterparty, and always at large-in scale sizes, which was not adopted.  
See European Parliament, proposal for regulation (COM(2011)0652 – C7-0359/2011 – 2011/0296(COD)). 
14.5.2012; Moloney, N. (2014), p. 462. 
82 Directive 2014/65/EU, Preamble (20). 
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transactions in financial instruments that are not concluded on multilateral systems or on 
systematic internalisers, must comply with the relevant MiFIR requirements for over-the-
counter trading (MiFID II Article 1(7)). The main requirement for systematic internalisers is to 
make public firm quotes in liquid instruments on a regular and continuous basis during normal 
trading hours. Under MiFIR, systematic internaliser is able to decide sizes at which they quote, 
provided that they are at least 10 % of standard market size83 and they are required to make 
available two way quotes – a bid price and an offer price.  
Under MiFID II, an investment firm is considered to be acting as systematic internaliser when 
an activity of dealing on own account by executing clients’ orders is frequent and systematic 
and substantial. 
First, the frequent and systematic basis should be measured by the number of over-the-counter 
trades in the financial instrument carried out by the investment firm on own account when 
executing clients’ order. 84 An investment firm is considered to be trading on a frequent and 
systematic basis when the number of over-the-counter transactions executed by this firm on 
own account in liquid instrument is, equal or larger than 0.4% of the total number of transactions 
in the relevant financial instrument in the European Union during the relevant period of time.85 
For illiquid instruments, the frequent and systematic criteria is deemed to be met when, during 
the relevant period of time, an investment firm has dealt on its own account over-the-counter in 
a financial instrument on average on a daily basis.86 
Second, the substantial basis is measured either by the size of the over-the-counter trading 
carried out by the investment firm in relation with the total trading volume in specific financial 
instrument or by the size of the over-the-counter trading carried in relation to the total trading 
in the European Union in a specific instrument.87 According to ESMA, client internalisation for 
a specific financial instrument should be considered as substantial when its accounts either: a) 
                                                 
83 Standard Market Size is a MiFID average order size threshold for firms conducting in-house business 
(internalisation). ESMA has considered in its Discussion Paper  whether the classes of average value of 
transactions and standard market size are still appropriate to ensure that obligations for systematic internalisers 
remain reasonable and proportionate. ESMA has found that the smallest class of average value of transactions had 
risen from 35% to 95% between 2008 and 2013 and tried to find possible options how the financial instruments 
should be grouped into classes and how the standard market size is established. For maintaining and enhancing 
transparency, ESMA proposed to establish classes by  average value of transactions for financial instruments with 
an average value of transactions larger than EUR 20 000. European Securities and Markets Authority. Discussion 
Paper. MiFID/MiFIR. ESMA/2014/548, 22.05.2014, p. 35. 
84 European Securities and Markets Authority. ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and 
MiFIR. ESMA/2014/1569, 19.12.2014, p. 220. 
85 Ibid., p. 223. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p. 220. 
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for 15% or more of the firm’s total turnover in that financial instrument, or b) for 0.4% of the 
total turnover for this financial instrument in the European Union.88  
Regardless of the abovementioned criteria, under MiFIR regulations, the investment firms can 
also voluntarily opt-in the systematic internaliser regime. The purpose of this option is in 
ESMA’s view to seek to ensure that a sufficient number of systematic internalisers are available 
in the context of the trading obligation for shares under Article 23 of MiFIR.89 Therefore, an 
investment firm which deals on its own account when executing clients’ orders for 
crowdfunding securities outside of regulated markets or MTFs would be a systematic 
internaliser, provided that it fulfils certain thresholds regarding frequent, systematic and 
substantial activity. 90 
Therefore, when crowdfunding secondary market is operated by an investment firm that is 
dealing on its own account by executing clients’ orders in frequent, systematic and substantial 
basis, such investment firm would be classified as systematic internaliser and it is required to 
inform its national authority of such activity. Investment firm, acting as systematic internaliser, 
will be subject to special disclosure requirements. 
  
                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 224. 
89 An investment firm shall ensure the trades it undertakes in shares admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
traded on a trading venue shall take place on a regulated market, MTF or systematic internaliser, or a third-country 
trading, unless their characteristics include that they: (a) are non-systematic, ad-hoc, irregular and infrequent; or 
(b) are carried out between eligible and/or professional counterparties and do not contribute to the price discovery 
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2. THE OBJECTIVES OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ON 
CROWDFUNDING SECONDARY MARKETS 
2.1. The subjects of information disclosure on crowdfunding secondary 
markets 
Secondary market disclosures have for a long time been regarded as fundamentally shareholder-
focused, as the aim of information disclosure was deemed to be exercising a corporate 
governance rule within the company rather than inform the investment decisions. In recent years 
the investor protection element in disclosure requirement has become more important and even 
some regulations that have previously been regarded as shareholder-focus, are now understood 
as having also investor protection purpose.91 Therefore, the subjects of information disclosure 
requirement on crowdfunding secondary markets would be both the potential investors who are 
evaluating the value of the company to make a reasonable investment decision, i.e. new 
crowdfunding investors on secondary market, as well as the existing shareholders in the 
company who have acquired stake in the company though initial crowdfunding rounds on 
primary markets and whose legitimate rights would otherwise easily be damaged by 
opportunistic behaviour of the managers and dominant shareholders. 
As regards investor protection, information disclosure is important to ensure maximum 
transparency in capital markets. Transparency helps to prevent corruption and illegal 
transactions and it is an important means of investor protection. It is also crucial that the 
investors are adequately informed and they understand the risks associated with the 
investments. Better transparency is a necessary condition for better market discipline, which is 
essential for maintaining financial stability.  From the issuers’ point of view, information 
disclosure helps to create more efficient capital markets by reducing fraudulent activities in the 
market, thereby increasing investors’ confidence. For crowdfunding investors, the information 
disclosed by the issuer is generally the only information available about the company. 
According to this information the investors must be able to evaluate the value of the stock in 
that company. When there would not be sufficient information available, the investors would 
be reluctant to take such high risks to invest in these companies. Consequently, the efficiency 
of crowdfunding secondary markets would decrease. 
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In addition to investor protection purpose, information disclosure is also important to ensure 
adequate protection for the existing shareholders in the company. Competent and committed 
shareholders who recognise and understand their roles in the company are considered to be an 
important prerequisite for the future growth and success of a company.92  Information disclosure 
is especially important for minority shareholders who have generally weaker position in the 
company and who may not otherwise have any overview over the companies’ activities. 
Without adequate disclosure requirements there may be also a risk for crowdfunding 
shareholder to be expropriated by the controlling shareholders and managers (insiders) of the 
company. The company may use several strategies to divide the revenues among “insides” and 
avoid any dividend payments to minority shareholders.93 Crowdfunding investors may face a 
risk that their investment will never materialise because it will be kept by the controlling 
shareholders or managers. 
The control rights of the outside investors can be shaped with legal rules and effectiveness of 
their enforcement.94 Mandatory disclosure requirements help to reduce opportunistic behaviour 
of the managers and controlling shareholders by limiting the option of silence or incomplete 
voluntary disclosures. Mandatory securities law disclosures demand the companies to provide 
specific information periodically and this requirement is ensured with legal enforcement, 
should the company fail to disclose required information or should the information be 
dishonest.95 Information disclosure makes the companies accountable to the shareholders as 
well as to general public. 96  Such a detailed information disclosure makes it more difficult for 
the managers and controlling shareholders to protect their private benefits and control and 
expropriate value without incurring these legal penalties or reputational costs.97  
Moreover, mandatory disclosure requirements provide information that is necessary for the 
minority shareholders to protect themselves through other mechanisms, such as voting rights 
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or litigation.98 Without mandatory information disclosure, the non-controlling crowdfunding 
shareholder would have no possibilities to determine whether or not the majority favours itself99 
and it would be even more difficult to prove such activities. Giving these shareholders full and 
timely access to information, in order to enhance good governance of the company, is equally 
important in listed companies, as well as on crowdfunding secondary markets.100 
It should also not be underestimated how information disclosure requirements encourage 
business participants (managers) to analyse the business.101 When managers are obliged to 
disclose information to shareholders and investors, they must first very deeply analyse the 
activity and the developments of the company and make sure that all the information published 
will be accurate and updated. In some sense it may even put pressure on the issuers to achieve 
better development of a company to avoid poor figures that would discourage investors to invest 
in that company. 
In sum, crowdfunding markets could be subject to similar investor protection issues, as well as 
market manipulation and insider trading risks may be similar as on regulated markets. Thus, 
the general objectives of information disclosure should be similar in all capital markets, i.e. the 
similar objectives apply to crowdfunding secondary markets and regulated markets. Disclosure 
of corporate information is important tool in achieving the accountability of management to 
shareholders and the company to general public but most importantly it is an important source 
of information for potential investors. An additional value of information disclosure is that it 
requires the company to keep updated records of its financial information and analyse the 
activity and development of the company in ongoing basis.  
 
2.2. Crowdfunding secondary markets’ transparency 
Adequate information disclosure is essential for achieving transparency in crowdfunding 
secondary markets. The key rationale of transparency is to ensure the effective integration of 
the equity markets, to promote the efficiency of the overall price formation process for equity 
instruments as well as to assist the effective operation of best execution obligations (Recital 44 
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of MiFID).  Achieving transparency in securities market requires transparency in the activity 
of market participants and access to information about the securities market. Transparency is 
an important condition for crowdfunding markets development since transparent activity on the 
market and access to information helps to reduce risks. Transparent market makes it possible 
for the participants to make informed investment decisions and at the same time it raises 
investors’ confidence into the market.102  
Generally, two elements in transparency are distinguished: pre-trade transparency and post-
trade transparency. In equity markets pre-trade transparency refers to the obligation to publish 
current orders relating to shares or share quotas, i.e. prices and amounts for selling and buying 
interest.103 Post-trade transparency refers to the obligation to publish a trade report every time 
a transaction has been concluded. The aim of post-trade information disclosure is to give 
historical overview of the transactions excluded rather than information about trading 
opportunities.104  
Three core objectives of market transparency could be highlighted in the context of securities 
markets:  financial stability, retail investor protection, and discouraging fraudulent and criminal 
activities.105  
Financial stability has been described as the ability of the financial system to maintain its basic 
functions without disruption that entail significant economic costs. The objective of financial 
stability is to ensure that the financial system can operate and can play the rule that it needs to 
play in the economy as a whole.106 Financial system comprises financial intermediaries, markets 
and market infrastructures. Financial instability can destroy wealth by disrupting investments, 
consumption and economic growth.107 Financial stability is also described as stable equilibrium, 
in which small disturbance may lead to drastic changes. An unstable equilibrium can arise from 
financial imbalance (e.g. housing price bubble, over-exposure of banking system to specific 
sector or region) or investors’ misassessment of risks. A shock to financial system may cause 
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discontinuity or, in case of worse scenario, even crises.108 The questions about risks created by 
the growing number of start-ups looking to disrupt traditional banking business and whether 
crowdfunding poses a systemic risk to the global financial sector have been addressed for 
example by the IOSCO. Although the IOSCO report concluded that the crowdfunding market 
does not present a direct systemic risk to the global financial sector at present, lack of 
transparency and disclosure risks are considered to be one of the key risks in crowdfunding 
business.109 Information disclosure reduces information asymmetries in market and thereby 
reduces also the risk of financial instability.110 
The second core objective of transparency of financial markets is investor protection.111 In 
general terms, investor protection means the protection of investors against financial losses as 
a result of fraud and other illegal activities. Unsophisticated investors are the most vulnerable 
to market abuse, such as market manipulation or insider trading.  Generally, the aim of investor 
protection measures is not to protect investors against a loss in the market value of security or 
inherit risks of investments.112 However, unsophisticated customers may not understand and 
may not be able to evaluate new financial products.113 In order to reduce unanticipated risks to 
households, investor protection measures shall also ensure that customers, investing in financial 
products, are sufficiently informed and protected. Investor protection is considered to be as a 
matter of public interest and on a macro-economic basis it is considered to be essential for the 
proper functioning of the marketplace.114 Moreover, transparency of financial products is 
deemed to be essential to improve these households’ welfare.115 Information disclosure helps 
customers to make informed investment decisions but it promotes also public understanding of 
the benefits, the risks and the embedded costs, associated with investing in different types of 
products. Regulative intervention helps to ensure that only most suitable products are offered 
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to customers, taking into account customers’ risk-bearing capability and financial 
sophistication.116 
Adequate information disclosure regime also helps to reduce fraudulent and criminal activities 
on crowdfunding secondary markets. Disclosure gives private individuals insights into the 
operation of the corporation as well as it supplies information that can be used by regulators 
and surveillance bodies with enforcing certain standards of corporate behaviour in public 
interest.117 Information disclosure gives the crowdfunding investors better overview of the 
activities of the issuer and makes it more difficult for the issuer to manipulate with the 
information and give wrong insights to the potential investors.  
However, it should be noted that although information disclosure is essential to create 
transparent capital markets, information disclosure alone may not always be sufficient to 
preserve financial stability, provide full protection to investors or eliminate all fraudulent 
activities in the market. Even in the most transparent financial markets it is not guaranteed that 
investors are able to do rational investment decisions. Investors may not be able to process 
information, especially when they are personally affected by the decision or when the 
information is too complex.118 For example, decisions of crowdfunding investors may be 
affected by advertisements of the platform or the company and the financial information 
provided by issuers may be complex and misleading for these investors. 
Therefore, although transparency is an important means for protecting investors, reducing 
fraudulent and criminal activities in the market and helping to ensure financial stability, 
transparency cannot replace other kinds of regulation. Market transparency must always 
support other financial regulations and information disclosure requirements must be prescribed 
by government and also guaranteed by government. 
 
2.3. The efficiency of crowdfunding secondary markets 
Another core objective of information disclosure on crowdfunding secondary markets is 
promoting efficiency in these markets. In a perfectly efficient market, based on the theory of 
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Eugene F. Fama, there would be no information asymmetries between the investors and the 
issuers. Efficient capital market theory is based on the idea that in an efficient market the prices 
at any time “fully reflect” the available information about the company. Therefore, in an 
efficient market, prices are efficient in two ways: first, the prices immediately integrate new 
information provided to the market, and second, the prices predict the future value of the 
stock.119  In this perfectly efficient market, there would be no information asymmetries between 
the issuers and the investors that could lead to market manipulation or other fraudulent 
activities. However, due to market failures120, the securities market can never be fully 
efficient.121  
The way how information asymmetries can reduce confidence into markets often been 
explained by an illustrative example, so-called “lemons problem”122 in U.S. literature. 
According to this theory, in case of information asymmetry, buyers have no means to evaluate 
the quality of marketed goods. As a result, the seller has also no incentive to offer quality goods 
in the market as buyers are not able to tell any difference between better and inferior ones. The 
buyers value all goods at the average level and, at the end, the inferior goods are overvalued 
and quality goods undervalued. This will keep the quality products away from the market as 
the prices for their goods are too low. Consequently, only the inferior goods (“lemons”) will be 
left in the market which will reduce buyers’ confidence in the market and integrity of the market 
will be low.123 When insiders know more about a firm’s securities, the securities can be 
“lemons”, so that new securities can be offered on discount. Therefore, if the company does not 
require the information that the investors require, the company will either not receive the credit 
or has to pay higher price for it.124 
One of the most important means for promoting investors’ confidence into the market is the 
requirement to disclose information125 which would give the investors a possibility to assess 
potential risks and rewards of their investments and thereby help them to protect their own 
                                                 
119 Willemaers, G. S. The EU Issuer-Disclosure Regime. Objectives and Proposals for Reform, p 59. 
120 The market failures can be scenarios where individuals pursue their self interest leads to results that will not be 
efficient. The market failures could be for example adverse selections, moral hazards or information monopolies. 
Ledyard, J. O. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, editors: Durlauf, S. N., Blume, L. 
E. 2008. 
121 Willemaers, G. S., p. 60. 
122 Akerlof, G. A. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
123 Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review 
of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, p. 3. 
124 OECD. Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies in Emerging Markets, p. 23. 
125 According to the principle 16 of IOSCO 2010 report, “(t)here should be full, accurate and timely disclosure of 
financial results, risk and other information which is material to investors’ decisions.” 
33 
 
interests.126 Moreover, the primary goal of the disclosure in secondary markets is to ensure that 
the prices are well informed.127 Some commentators have found that the issuer-disclosure is the 
most important instrument for increasing investors’ confidence.128 For example, efficiency 
argument was also claimed to have played the main rule in enactment of the U.S. securities 
acts, as it was believed that disclosure regulation would enhance investors’ confidence in capital 
markets.129 The purpose of regulations should be to ensure that enough sufficient and accurate 
information will be provided to the investors. This generally involves certain sanctions or 
liability of the issuer or persons failing to exercise due diligence in gathering and provision of 
such information.130  
Disclosure regulation ensures the dissemination of financial information that otherwise would 
not be made available to the investors. Moreover, it allows public opinion (e.g. media) to 
promote discussion of the data and open discussions on issuer’s performance. As a result, 
investors’ confidence in the economy as a whole will be raised.131 Thus, disclosure improves 
the liquidity of market by reducing the information asymmetry, as reduced information 
asymmetry increases investors’ confidence and increased investors’ confidence leads to higher 
transaction volume and market efficiency. 
However, information asymmetries may not be the only factor reducing investors’ confidence 
and thereby making the markets less efficient. Market efficiency may also be undermined by 
fraudulent activities in the market, such as market manipulation or insider trading. Market 
manipulation may include dissemination of false or misleading information, bad faith 
transactions which are likely to give false or misleading signals to the market, fictitious or 
deceptive transactions and positioning of the price (SMA § 18815(1)). Market manipulation 
involves interference with the market’s normal price-forming mechanism and thereby it 
undermines the efficiency, credibility and integrity of the market.132 As a result investors will 
lose their trust in such financial markets and will eventually give up investing or will invest in 
different sources.   
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One of the difficulties with fighting against market manipulation is that not always the 
fraudulent misrepresentations are clear and straightforward. In most of the cases these are 
highly complex and not easily detectable trading practices, designed to increase or decrease a 
securities’ trading volumes, distort the price or interfere with market forces of supply and 
demand.133 Market manipulation practices are also continually evolving as new products are 
developed or new participants enter into the marketplace.134  Low-priced securities, such as 
securities acquired through crowdfunding, may be more susceptible to fraud and market 
manipulation. Although crowdfunding, and especially secondary markets for crowdfunding, are 
a very new phenomenon in financial markets, it may give rise to undetected possibilities of 
abusive behaviour by the managers or the dominant shareholders. Misuse of information or 
misrepresentations and false statements can affect the confidence of crowdfunding investors.  
Market manipulation and insider trading are closely related and in some situations it may be 
difficult to differentiate these concepts. However, the main difference is that manipulation 
consists of actions manipulating asset prices not necessarily based on privileged information as 
it is in case of insider trading.135 Insider trading is considered to cause an adverse selection 
problem and therefore low liquidity, low prices, large bid ask spreads, high cost of capital and 
market breakdown under some conditions.  Outside investors lose their confidence and invest 
less.136 
Insider trading is deemed to impair market efficiency because when we allow insider trading, 
it might cause insiders to delay information disclosure for the purposes of exploiting insider 
trading opportunities. This is because insiders would have strong incentives to withhold non-
public price-sensitive information as they may be a possibility to profit on the basis of that 
information. Moreover, there may be a risk that the managers will withhold disclosure of 
information in order to reduce the risks that the market will not move as anticipated.137  Because 
investors cannot easily distinguish shares in companies that present the risk of insider trading 
from the companies where it would not be, all of the investments will be discounted as reflecting 
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the possible risk of insider trading. At the end, investors may refrain from investing altogether 
and thus the company might have difficulties with raising capital.138 
The harm to investors resulting from insider trading can be understood in two ways. First, the 
harm to each individual in specific insider trading cases from micro perspective which may 
bring private civil liability to insiders, and second, the harm which is caused to investors in 
general in macro perspective. It is argued that in markets with insiders the outside investors will 
always bear the cost of insider trading. Insiders will never buy unless the market price is too 
low and they will never sell unless the price is too high. Market makers would systematically 
lose. However, market makers tend to treat these possible losses to insiders as additional costs 
of maintaining the market and will tend to recover this cost from market participants. Therefore, 
all outside market participants will bear the costs of insider trading. Moreover, some 
commentators have pointed out the mathematical relationship between an insider trader’s gain 
and the loss of investors (so-called Law of Conservation of Securities). It means that when 
someone trades on inside information, all other investors suffer loss which is equivalent to the 
insider trader’s gain.139 In crowdfunding markets, such loss would be covered most likely by 
crowdfunding investors who are standing far from the insiders circle. Without mandatory 
information disclosure, the issuer may avoid making available such information and 
crowdfunding investors would thus not even be aware of such insider dealings. 
Market manipulation control systems are designed to avoid the misuse of material information 
by supplementing or including insider-dealing rules by avoiding the dissemination of 
misleading or false information that would distort the trading prices or trading volumes.  In 
order to prevent market manipulation and maintain honesty in the market, the positive 
disclosure obligations to issuer may not be sufficient; the disclosure obligations must be 
supported by additional negative obligation, i.e. prohibition to disclose false or misleading 
information. In order to be effective, these obligations must be prescribed and guaranteed by 
the state. 
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2.4. Information disclosure requirements and objectives in private 
companies 
In non-listed companies, the managers are required to disclose certain information to 
shareholders. After an investor has invested in a company, the investor attains a legal position 
in that company which gives the investor a justified interest in the property in which the 
investment was made. On the basis of this interest, the investor shall have a right to obtain 
information from the management about the activities of the company. Such information 
disclosure makes it possible for the shareholder to exercise also other rights in the company, 
such as voting rights or other minority shareholder rights. 140 
The management board of a company is required to act in the most economically purposeful 
manner (§ 306(2) of the CC). According to § 138 of Estonian General Part of the Civil Code 
Act, rights shall be exercised and obligations shall be performed in good faith. Estonian 
Supreme court has found in 30th April 2003 and 2nd June 2003 cases that the responsibilities 
of the member of management board is to avoid the conflict of interests between the 
management and the company.141 However, the obligation to act in best possible way for the 
company and avoid conflict of interests would not be effective without information disclosure 
obligations as there would not be sufficient control mechanisms to discover such unlawful acts. 
Under Estonian Commercial Code (hereinafter CC), different disclosure regime applies to 
private limited companies (osaühing) and public limited companies (aktsiaselts). Investor in a 
private limited company has higher information disclosure requirements than in public limited 
company because private limited company is generally considered to be smaller company in 
which the shareholders are more closely connected with the everyday activities of the 
company.142 As the competence of the investors in private limited companies is, in principle, 
unlimited and the shareholders could do decisions that are generally in the competence of the 
management (§ 168 (2) of CC), the investors in these companies need complete information to 
make informed and reasonable decisions. Therefore, they shall also have a right for access to 
the documents of the company.143  
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The shareholders in public limited companies have less rights for information. They have a 
right to require information from the management only in the general meeting (§ 287 of the 
CC). Moreover, the investor in public limited company does not have a right of access to the 
documents of the company. Nevertheless, there are certain documents to which the shareholders 
shall always have an access. These documents include annual report (§ 332 of the CC), the draft 
of resolution (§ 2931(5) of the CC) and the minutes of the general meeting (§ 304 (4) of the 
CC). In addition, Estonian Supreme Court has found that in addition to the minutes of the 
general meeting, the shareholders also have a right to access to its annexes.144 
The right for access to documents is also regulated in Estonian Law of Obligations Act 
(hereinafter LOA). According to § 1015 of LOA, a person who has a legitimate interest in 
examining a document which is in the possession of another person may demand that the 
possessor of the document allow the document to be examined if the document has been 
prepared in the interests of the person who wishes to examine the document or if the document 
sets out a legal relationship between such person and the possessor of the document or the 
preparation of a transaction between those persons. The provisions of CC as ius specialis 
prevails on the LOA and therefore solely the provisions of CC will apply investor is not obliged 
to prove his or her interest in the information but the  right for the access to the documents 
results from the membership rights. Although the investors in public limited companies do not 
have the right for access to documents, they may still have such a right under § 1015 of LOA, 
provided that all the prerequisites are fulfilled.145 
The extent of information disclosure is closely connected with the loyalty obligation as well as 
with the obligation to act in good faith. These obligations are reciprocal; the aim of the 
information requirement by the investor shall not be malicious or in any way damaging the 
company and the information disclosed by the company must be right and accurate. The right 
to require information disclosure must, however, comply with the principle of reasonableness. 
For example, it would be considered generally unreasonable if a shareholder requires 
information disclosure at night or during national holidays.146 
The management board may refuse to give information or to present documents if there is a 
basis to presume that this may cause significant damage to the interests of the private limited 
company (§ 166 (2) of CC). This information disclosure limitation aims to set the interests of 
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the company above the interests of the shareholder in situations where the interests of the 
company would be damaged due to information disclosed. The damage shall not be understood 
solely in the meaning of § 128(2) of the LOA but it may include also damaging general interests 
of the company. The risk of damaging company’s interests must not necessarily be directly 
connected with the disclosed information itself but the risk that some interests of the company 
may be damaged due to information disclosure, must be sufficiently important.147 
In practice, information disclosure has been denied when the investor is a competitor of the 
company or a person who is closely connected with the competitor. However, the fact that an 
investor is a competitor of the company does not automatically mean that the company may 
deny to disclose any information. The interests of the investor and the company must be 
evaluated in case by case basis.148  For example, Estonian Supreme Court has found in 
17th September 2013 case that despite the fact that the shareholders in public limited company 
are closely connected with a competitor of the company, the shareholders have a right to receive 
information about remunerations paid to the management board, the agreements concluded with 
the members of the management board and their close family members and the benefits received 
under these agreements.149 The same principle applies to shareholders in private limited 
companies.150 
In addition to shareholders’ right to require information disclosure, the minority shareholders 
in private limited companies have an additional protection measure against the opportunistic 
behaviour of the managers. Shareholders whose shares represent at least one-tenth of the share 
capital may demand a resolution on conduct of a special audit on matters regarding the 
management or financial situation of the private limited company, and the appointment of an 
auditor for the special audit by a resolution of the shareholders (§ 191 (1) of the CC). The aim 
of special audit is also to disclose certain information to shareholders but in this case it is more 
burdensome for the company as the abovementioned grounds for denial of information 
disclosure will not apply.151  
The disclosure requirements in non-listed companies are aimed to protect the interests of the 
existing shareholders and promote corporate governance. This information disclosure is not 
protecting the potential investors from market abuse or contributing to formation of fair price 
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148 Ibid., p. 254. 
149 Judgement of the Civil Law Chamber of Estonian Supreme Court no. 3-2-1-86-13, paras. 15, 17 
150 Saare, K., Volens, U., Vutt, A., Vutt. M., p. 254. 
151 Ibid., p. 255. 
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or helping crowdfunding investors to make informed investment decisions. The information is 
directed to the shareholders not to general public or third persons. Moreover, individuals who 
do not have a shareholder’s legal status are not granted with a right to require any information 
disclosure. Therefore, these information disclosure requirements would not be sufficient to 
provide transparent crowdfunding secondary markets or promote efficiency in these markets. 
 
2.5. Information disclosure requirements and objectives on regulated 
markets 
The information disclosure regime is vastly more extensive when securities are traded on 
regulated markets. The issuers are subject to prospectus requirement as well as stringent 
ongoing and periodic information disclosure requirements under Transparency Directive. 
Moreover, in order to eliminate market abuses, regulated markets are subject to specific 
disclosure requirements under the market abuse regime. 
Prospectus is a legally required document presenting information about a company which helps 
investors to decide whether to invest in variety of securities issued by the company.152 Before 
enactment of the SMA, Estonian Supreme Court has held that the purpose of prospectus is to 
provide overview of the economic situation of the issuer, describe the conditions of the 
securities issued and give other information needed for making an informed investment 
decision.153 The court has referred to the earlier securities market act,154 which gave more 
general definition of the prospectus than the SMA. Although the current § 14 of SMA, which 
has been transposed from the Prospectus Directive, provides for more detailed and 
comprehensive definition and purpose of the prospectus requirement, the core objectives of the 
document have remained the same. 
One of the purposes of the EU Prospectus Directive was to make it easier and cheaper for 
companies to raise capital throughout the EU on the basis of a single approval from the 
regulatory authority in one Member State.155 In other words, it is enough that a company 
publishes prospectus, which meets certain requirements arising from the Prospectus Directive, 
                                                 
152 Ibid., p. 2.  
153 Judgement of the Civil Law Chamber of Estonian Supreme Court no. 3-2-1-24-96. 
154 Väärtpaberituru seadus [Securities Market Act] – RT I 1993, 35, 543. 
155 European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, p. 4. 
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in one member state, in order to issue securities also in other member states on the basis of the 
same document. Moreover, the Prospectus Directive is a maximum harmonisation directive156 
which means that Member States cannot impose higher standards to the information disclosure 
as it is prescribed in the directive. This avoids the Member States to impose higher information 
disclosure requirements to issuers that would prevent capital raising.157 However, between 
certain thresholds, the directive leaves Member States with considerable freedom in its 
implementation and application. This has caused a situation in which in different Member States 
the applicability of prospectus requirements is considerably different.158 Fragmentation of 
prospectus disclosure requirements in Member States may be an issue also in crowdfunding 
markets as  it causes uncertainties of the applicable requirements in other states and thereby 
may cause several expenses to issuers (e.g. hiring local councils, bring the documents into line 
with other states’ requirements). On 30.11.2015 European Commission made a legislative 
proposal for a new Prospectus Regulation which was a result of the review of Prospectus 
Directive. The biggest change in the review proposal is that European Commission proposes to 
change the original directive to regulation, which in practice means that the regulation will be 
directly applicable in all Member States and thereby would harmonise the current regulation in 
EU. According to European Commission, uniformity in these rules is needed in order to abolish 
obstacles hindering a smooth functioning of the internal market.159 
Article 5(1) of Prospectus Directive sets out the core principle of disclosure of the information 
to investors, stating that the prospectus shall contain all information which, according to the 
particular nature of the issuer and of the securities offered to the public or admitted to trading 
                                                 
156 Ferran, E. Building an EU Securities Market. Cambridge University Press, New York: 2004, p. 145. 
157 Considering the minimum value of the offer of securities per all the Member States, European Commission has 
made a proposal on 30.11.2015 to extend the threshold from EUR 100, 000 to EUR 500,000 in all Member States. 
One of the reasons for the proposed amendment has been the impact to securities-based crowdfunding in those 
nine member states (including Estonia) where it is currently required a prospectus for offers below EUR 500 000. 
As now, the crowdfunding platforms and companies, wishing to raise money via crowdfunding, need to carry out 
county-to-county analyses in each Member States in order conduct cross-border business activities. Raising the 
threshold to EUR 500 000 is considered to provide a safe harbour for the development of the vast majority of 
crowdfunding activities. See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment. 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, p. 20. 
158 Under the SMA, an offer of securities is not deemed to be public in the following cases: 1) an offer of securities 
addressed solely to qualified investors, or 2) an offer of securities addressed to fewer than 150 persons per 
Contracting State, other than qualified investors, or 3) an offer of securities addressed to investors who acquire 
securities for a total consideration of at least 100,000 Euros per investor, for each separate offer, or 4) an offer of 
securities with the nominal value or book value of at least 100,000 Euros per security, or 5) an offer of securities 
with a total consideration of less than 100,000 Euros per all the Member States in total calculated in a one-year 
period of the offer of the securities. 
159 European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading., p. 5. 
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on a regulated market, is necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment of the 
assets and liabilities, financial position, profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer of any 
guarantor, and of the rights attaching to such securities. Therefore, the main purpose of 
prospectus is to protect investors in capital markets. The information in prospectus should help 
the investors to make informed investment decisions, evaluate possible risks and possible gains 
and losses that an investment may bring. Moreover, the prospectus is aimed to protect also retail 
investors. The orientation towards retail investors’ protection is reflected by the fact that the 
issuer has to provide a prospectus summary, which must inform the investors about the basic 
risks and give the essential information about the issuer, guarantor and securities in short and 
non-technical form.160  
The provision of full information concerning securities and issuers of those securities promotes 
protection of investors as well as it provides an effective means of increasing confidence in 
securities and thus of contributing to the proper functioning and development of securities 
markets. Publishing a prospectus is considered to be the most appropriate way to make this 
information available.161 The same information disclosure objectives that prospectus is aimed 
to achieve on regulated markets should be achieved also on crowdfunding secondary markets. 
However, the Prospectus Directive requires that prospectus must be published when securities 
are offered to public or are admitted to trading on regulated market. Provided that the offer of 
securities does not constitute a ‘public offer’, MTF falls outside of the scope of Prospectus 
Directive and the prospectus requirements also do not apply when the securities are traded over-
the-counter. Therefore, prospectus requirement would generally not apply when the securities 
would be admitted to trading on crowdfunding secondary markets. Although, it must be 
admitted that prospectus would also be a valuable source of information for crowdfunding 
investors, the question here arises whether it would be proportionate to require young 
companies that are searching for funding through crowdfunding, comply with the same rigid 
disclosure rules as the big companies on regulated markets. 
The Transparency Directive162 establishes rules on periodic financial reports – annual and half-
yearly financial reports – and disclosure of major shareholders for issuers whose securities are 
                                                 
160 Haar, B. Organizing Regional Systems: The EU Example – The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation. 
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161 Directive 2003/71/EC, recital 18. 
162 The Transparency Directive was issued in 2004 and implemented in Estonian SMA in 2007  whereas the 
amendments of the directive entered into force on 26 November 2013  and were implemented into SMA in 2015. 
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[Explanatory memorandum to the amendment of Securities Market Act and the other laws in connection, Draft 
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admitted on a regulated market. The directive introduces minimum information requirements 
that the companies whose securities are traded on a regulated market must provide.163 The 
transparency requirements are considered to be rather investors’ protection than shareholder’s 
protection measure, although shareholders benefit from the disclosure as well.164 The objectives 
of the directive is to attract investors to the European market place and to improve the 
efficiency, openness and integrity of capital markets.  
The minimum information requirements consist of audited financial statements, such as 
management report and statements by those who are responsible for information disclosure in 
the company165 and imposes more detailed half-yearly reports, consisting of the condensed set 
of financial statements, interim management report and statements of reliability.166 The 
management report provides a strategic overview of the company’s position and summary of 
material events and risks of the company, whereby complimenting the financial disclosure and 
giving more holistic picture of the company’s performance.167  These information disclosure 
requirements make sure that the investors will receive full and updated information about the 
company’s activities in order to give investors adequate information for making investment 
decisions and thereby raising market efficiency. Moreover, the information disclosure 
requirements increase market transparency and avoid fraudulent activities and opportunistic 
behaviour of the managers of the company. As the issuer is obliged to disclose certain 
information, the market participants are waiting to receive such information. Any missing or 
controversial information would give rise to doubts of possible illegal activities by the managers 
of the company. 
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The Transparency Directive also sets forth the requirement to the issuers to provide information 
to holders of shares so as to facilitate participation in general meeting.168 The directive contains 
provisions to the notification obligations in respect of the acquisition of disposal of major 
shareholdings. This requirement is implemented to § 185 of the SMA, establishing the 
obligation to notify of number of votes in issuer if the number of votes in an issuer of shares 
belonging to a person constitutes 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 or 50 per cent, or 1/3 or 2/3 of all the votes 
represented by the shares. This disclosure requirement informs also the other shareholders 
whether some of the shareholders would acquire significant shareholding or control over the 
company. 
Similarly as the prospectus requirement, the information disclosure requirements under 
Transparency Directive apply only to securities which are listed on regulated markets, i.e. it is 
not applicable to the MTF markets.169 Admission to trading on regulated markets has been 
strongly differentiated from admission to trading on other trading venues as extending this 
concept has been considered to lead significant confusion as to the content and quality of the 
information. Users of alternative trading venues are considered to be of a different category 
from those of the regulated markets and therefore also the need for specific obligation of 
publication, storage and filing is deemed to be different.170 Therefore, the issuers who list the 
securities exclusively on an MTF or trade the securities over-the-counter, would not have to 
comply with the existing disclosure requirements. However, the author of this thesis notes that 
such interpretation may leave the investors on crowdfunding secondary markets without 
sufficient information and may cause serious shortage in investor protection on crowdfunding 
secondary markets. 
In order to curb possible market manipulation and insider trading on capital markets, certain 
disclosure requirements have been introduced under the market abuse regime. Market Abuse 
Directive I implemented measures for fighting against insider trading and market manipulation, 
requiring directors and other persons discharging managerial responsibilities in a company and 
persons connected to them to report transactions in the issuer’s securities.  
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The aim of the EU market abuse regime is to protect market integrity and eliminate unlawful 
behaviour in the financial markets. Information disclosure is one of the most important elements 
for achieving such objectives. The Market Abuse Regulation requires to disclose inside 
information and to maintain insider lists as well as requires disclosure in relation to conducting 
transactions on own account by PDMR171 or  their closely associated persons. Market Abuse 
Regulation introduced also the ‘close period’ for the managers of the companies.172 It means 
that the person discharging managerial responsibilities within an issuer shall not conduct any 
transactions on its own account or for the account of a third party relating to the shares during 
a closed period of 30 calendar days before the announcement of an interim financial report or 
a year-end report. The aim of this requirement is to avoid conducting transactions in high risk 
period of insider dealing.173 Such disclosures help to curb insider trading and market 
manipulation174 and providing information to shareholders about the director’s interests in the 
company makes the financial incentives the director available to the shareholders.175  
When Market Abuse Directive I affects only firms and individuals participating in  regulated 
market176, Market Abuse Directive II and Market Abuse Regulation widen the scope also to 
financial instruments traded on MTFs, OTFs and over-the-counter.177 Therefore, inside 
information disclosure rules will be also applicable to securities traded on markets operating as 
MTFs as well as over-the-counter, such as systematic internalisers. The author of this thesis is 
in opinion that when crowdfunding secondary markets would not be subject to any information 
disclosure requirements under the market abuse regime, it would pose high risks of abusive 
activities in these markets as due to lower knowledge and experience in investments, 
crowdfunding investors are highly vulnerable and would have no protection against fraudulent 
activities. The investors very often do not notice the abusive activities in the market and if they 
do, it is difficult to find any remedies. As the investments are generally rather small, the costs 
for court proceedings would be disproportionately high and therefore the investors would not 
even seek for judicial aid.  
                                                 
171 A PDMR is defined in Market Abuse Regulation as a person within an issuer who is (i) a member of the 
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3. PROPORTIONALITY OF MANDATORY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS ON CROWDFUNDING SECONDARY MARKETS 
3.1. Mandatory versus voluntarily information disclosure  
The most important question concerning information disclosure on crowdfunding secondary 
markets is, whether these information disclosure needs state intervention, i.e. whether the 
information disclosure requirements should be prescribed and guaranteed by a state or whether 
the information disclosure could be regulated by the free market forces. 
Unlike most of the goods circulating in economy, securities do not have intrinsic value. That is 
why information about securities in capital markets may be very precious. The real value of a 
security is considered to be the discounted income that the owner of the security will receive in 
the future. This income, however, depends on the cash flows of the issuer in the future. As the 
future events are always uncertain and depend on different risks and the investors can only 
predict these events according to the information they have been provided with. Therefore, any 
information about the issuer’s past events and future plans, about the competence of its 
managers and similar information may be very precious for investors. 178  
Securities market has also been seen as information market, where investors are willing to pay 
more for reliable information.  In free market conditions, limited resources are divided in society 
without regulatory intervention on the basis of the willingness of the members of the society to 
pay. Therefore, if we assume the rationality of the members of securities market, the supply and 
the demand of information in unregulated market conditions should achieve a balance in 
effective use of the resources, i.e. an equilibrium in which any additional unit of information 
would be more expensive then the benefit obtained with this information.179 
As the above-described information asymmetry problem („lemons  problem“) showed, an 
investor who does not have adequate information, will evaluate all the securities  with general 
value and will not be willing to pay more for higher quality securities. Therefore, all the 
securities would be sold with discounted price. An issuer who discloses more information may, 
however, sell the securities with higher price.  
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The functioning of voluntarily information disclosure depends also on the existence of anti-
fraud rules as the investors have limited possibilities to verify the accuracy and veracity of the 
information.180 There are also several additional factors that the investors may rely on even 
without any information disclosure. For example, the reputation of the issuer, accounting and 
auditing measures, including the services of rating agencies, have been named as additional  
important factors for the investors to decide whether to invest in a certain company.181 However, 
in crowdfunding secondary markets, the companies are rather recently established, small and 
unknown and thus the reputation may not assist the investors in their decision-making. Also, 
due to small size of these companies, they may not be rated by the agencies. The weakness of 
accountants or auditors is, however, that they are designated and remunerated by the issuer 
itself and thus possible conflict of interest situation may arise.182 
The proponents of mandatory information disclosure argue that due to market failures the 
perfect equilibrium in the capital market is not possible. For example, market failures may arise 
information asymmetry between the issuers and the investors. As issuers are always likely to 
find that the cost of making disclosure to the extent demanded by investors is higher than the 
possible benefits, the issuers have no incentive to make disclosure to the same extent as 
demanded by the investors.183 Furthermore, the issuers may decide to disclose information 
selectively in order to provide investors only with information that would raise the value of the 
company in investors’ eyes. Therefore, if left market forces, some information would be 
voluntary disclosed by issuers but this information would always be sub-optimal compared to 
the extent of the information that the investors actually demand.184 Moreover, without 
disclosure requirements imposed by state, some information would never be disclosed because 
private corporations have no incentive to disclose voluntary information that would give other 
corporations certain competitive advantage (e.g. information about new products). Each 
corporation would be willing to disclose only if others were required to do likewise.185  
Moreover, the less is the stake of the managers in the share capital, the higher is the probability 
that these managers would try to acquire the resources of the company with additional rewards 
or non-monetary benefits. In this case, although the disclosure of information would be in the 
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interests of the company, the managers may decide not to disclose such information.186 As 
crowdfunding investors are generally not closely connected with the everyday activities of the 
company and its managers, it may be very difficult to obtain such information if the managers 
decide not to disclose that. As a result, the investors are deprived from the returns that they 
would have otherwise been entitled to.  
Therefore, issuers must be obliged to disclose the information about the company and the worth 
of the securities as for the investors on crowdfunding secondary markets this information would 
be very difficult to discover otherwise. Although, it would be possible that the investors pay for 
independent analyses and find out the information by themselves, it would make investing for 
them very expensive. Considering the general nature and small size of crowdfunding 
investments, it would be unreasonable to require crowdfunding investors to conduct 
independent financial analyses of these companies. When the investors are not sufficiently 
informed and they would need to collect the information by themselves, the investors would 
not be attracted by the crowdfunding securities markets and this would adversely affect issuers’ 
capital raising process. Thus, the rule of the state should be to provide a framework of rules to 
facilitate adequate disclosure to help the crowdfunding investors to make informed choices and 
to avoid any false descriptions being disclosed. 
 
3.2. The general limitations of mandatory disclosure requirement 
Legislative measures for the mandatory information disclosure regime needs to be in 
compliance with relevant fundamental rights embodied in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (hereinafter: CFREU). Legislative measures for mandatory information disclosure 
obligation should be necessary and proportionate. From one side any disclosure obligation 
restricts the right for the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the CFREU) and freedom to 
conduct a business (Article 16 of the CFREU). From other side, sufficient disclosure is needed 
to ensure adequate customer protection (Article 38 of the CFREU). However, according to 
Article 52 of the CFREU, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.  Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
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meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
The main objectives of information disclosure requirements, as discussed in more detail in 
second chapter of this thesis, are to ensure market transparency and enhance market efficiency. 
Transparency of financial markets helps to maintain financial stability, protects investors and 
discourages fraudulent and criminal activities in the market. In order to achieve effective 
financial markets, it is important to reduce information asymmetry between the companies and 
investors and eliminate abusive activities from the market. 
Moreover, European Union polices shall ensure high level of consumer protection (Article 38 
of CFREU). Information disclosure makes it possible for the investors to evaluate companies’ 
activities, evaluate the fair price of the securities as well as it protects investors from insider 
trading or market manipulation. Once acquired share quotas or shares in a company, 
information disclosure protects investors from discriminative treatment and makes it possible 
to exercise their shareholders’ rights, such as voting rights or rights for dividends. Without 
mandatory information disclosure the shareholders may easily be deprived of their rights due 
to opportunistic behaviour of the controlling shareholders and/or managers and would even 
have no evidence to claim the violation of their rights.  
From the other side, everyone has the right to the protection for personal data. Such data must 
be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Any information of the company 
would be qualified as “personal data” when it relates to an identifiable person. Identifiable 
means that even if the person is not directly known, one can speak about personal data if there 
are ways to identify the person. 187 Under Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46/EC,188 processing 
constitutes any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data such as, 
inter alia, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available. Therefore, 
information disclosed by a company under mandatory provisions may qualify as personal data 
and the obligations for disclosing such data should be proportionate.  
Besides, disclosure obligations increase administrative burden of the company and may restrict 
the fundamental right for a freedom to conduct business under Article 16 of the CFREU. Prior 
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to the coming into force of the CFREU, the ECJ had already confirmed that the principle of 
protection for freedom to conduct business would extend to protection for the established 
market position of an undertaking and the need to maintain a degree of certainty with regard to 
its economic planning.189 Moreover, the court has several times ruled that the protection of 
business secrets is a general principle of European Law.190 In the case Interseroh the ECJ added 
that that the protection of commercial secrecy is another area of substantive protection covered 
by the right to protection of business. 191 Restrictions may be imposed, provided that they do 
not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of 
the rights guaranteed.192 
Therefore, the legislative measures for mandatory disclosure requirements should be 
proportionate and not excessively restricting the companies right for freedom of business. The 
objectives of the directives and regulations regulating the extent of disclosure requirements for 
issuers is to balance the trade-off between investor protection and limiting administrative 
burden for issuers. 
 
3.3. Rationales of different levels of mandatory disclosure requirements for 
listed and non-listed companies 
Under current EU legal framework, mandatory information disclosure requirements are 
substantially different in private and public companies. Public companies are obliged to provide 
a prospectus to the potential investors193 and must follow certain transparency rules as provided 
by the Transparency Directive. Under MiFID I, the transparency requirements are applicable 
only to regulated markets. Although, MiFID II and MiFIR will change the situation by applying 
the transparency rules also to other trading venues such as MTFs and investment firms operating 
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as systematic internalisers,194 the other directives, such as Prospectus Directive and 
Transparency Directive, regulating the disclosure obligations for issuers in regulated markets 
remain non-applicable crowdfunding securities traded outside of regulated markets and the 
issuer-disclosure requirements are considerably lower than for listed companies. 
The primary source of information for investors in publicly traded companies is the periodic 
publication of company’s annual accounts and reports.195 In addition to the requirement to 
publish periodic reports, the companies are also obliged to make disclosure of information for 
a different purpose if necessary. Four kind of ad hoc disclosure requirements are distinguished: 
inside information disclosure requirement, directors’ shareholdings and major shareholdings 
and disclosure required by the listing rules.196 According to OECD report, information 
disclosure in listed companies shall give a possibility to investors to keep track of them and the 
regulatory agencies to supervise them. Listed companies shall observe the following principles 
in disclosing information: 
1) Principle of authenticity. The information disclosed must be objective, consistent and 
standardised and may not contain false records; 
2) Principle of accuracy. The information disclosed must be accurate and shall not use any 
expressions that are misleading or cause confusion; 
3) Principle of completeness. Listed companies must make public the relevant information in 
compliance with laws, as well as rules of securities regulatory institutions and stock exchanges; 
4) Principle of timeliness.  Information must be disclosed insofar as possible without delay; 
5) Principle of fairness. Listed companies must treat their investors in the same manner and are 
not allowed to disclose information to some certain investors only.197 
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Financial reports are supposed to give complete and understandable picture of a company’s 
financial position, thereby minimizing market uncertainty.198 All these principles have been 
proposed to companies whose shares are listed in regulated market and the non-listed 
companies have been left out from discussion.  Although, it should not be at issue that market 
transparency and efficiency should be achieved in all markets, due to the costs of information 
and the obligations that are placed on the company, information disclosure cannot be unlimited. 
The extent of mandatory disclosure requirements should be proportionate, taking into account 
both the obligations and the restrictions of the rights of the company concerning the disclosure 
and the benefits that information disclosure gives to investors, i.e. how the mandatory obligation 
to disclose certain information helps to achieve transparency and efficiency objectives. OECD, 
giving its assessment about the benefits of introducing mandatory financial reporting in large 
private companies, it has been in view that the benefits of such disclosure obligation is unlikely 
to overweight the costs. OECD found that the benefits are either likely to be contracted 
voluntarily or are likely to be minor.199  
The costs of mandatory disclosure requirements are generally considered to be higher 
compliance costs and administration costs.  Publishing financial accounts incurs additional 
costs for administering and regulating the disclosure, as well as for filing and processing the 
information.200 Moreover, for many companies these direct costs may even not be that 
significant than the indirect costs, such as loss of personal privacy and loss of competitive 
position. Information is a private good of a company201 and it should be carefully examined 
whether the benefits of the disclosure overweight the enterprises’ rights for privacy. 
Higher disclosure requirements always entail loss in company’s privacy and this may result in 
loss in competitive position. Privacy costs have been considered as one of the most important 
cost to the company.202  When information on the financial position and performance is made 
public, the enterprises give up some of their personal privacy in certain extent. Loss in privacy 
may result in loss of competitive position for some companies. 203 For example, disclosing 
accounting data the firm also informs its competitors and gives then an evidence of its success 
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or lack of success in the market.204 However, it can be argued that when all companies have the 
same obligations for information disclosure, they will be in the same position. Nevertheless, 
requiring private companies to disclose their financial information could result in loss of 
competitive position for these companies that combine through co-operative or franchise 
structure relative as individual member companies co-operative or franchise would be required 
to disclose publicly their accounts, while the other companies that are part of a single 
consolidated company, are required only to report publicly at the consolidated level.205 As a 
result, an attempt to achieve entity neutrality may result in undermining neutrality between 
separately owned and wholly owned companies.206  
However, when a company goes public, it will be in a certain position in which they are required 
to provide adequate level of information to investors in order to achieve transparency and 
efficiency of the financial markets. The author of the current thesis is in opinion that the same 
principles should be applicable when the securities are traded on alternative trading venues as 
the investors’ need for information is similar. The investor should receive the same information 
on securities traded on crowdfunding secondary markets and in case those securities are traded 
on a regulated market.207 Therefore, in the sense of information disclosure requirements, 
companies should be classified as public companies which includes also companies whose 
shares are traded on regulated markets, and private companies. Asking the same information 
disclosure from private companies as it is required for the companies whose shares are listed 
on regulated markets would be disappropriate as it is excessively restricting these companies’ 
rights for privacy and freedom of business. When the securities are offered on crowdfunding 
secondary markets, the issuers should be similarly responsible to provide adequate information 
to the investors as it is on regulated markets. High level of consumer protection, as one of the 
most important policy in all capital markets in EU and it should be provided to customers 
regardless of the market structure or operator. Information disclosure is the most important 
means for the investors to understand the value of the company, fair price of the securities and 
the value of company’s activities as well as it limits market manipulation and insider trading.  
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3.4. The need for specific disclosure regime for crowdfunding secondary 
markets 
Information disclosure requirements are based on the principle that the disclosed information 
should be proportionate concerning the addressees’ actual need for information. For example, 
in United States, a famous Supreme Court decision from 1953, concerning the interpretation of 
the concept of private placement, the court stated that the registration (and thus disclosure) 
exemption under federal law208 in favour of private offerings must rely on the offerees' actual 
need for protection209 thus, an offering should not be considered public, and therefore subject 
to more strict disclosure requirements, as long as the target offerees are able to “fend for 
themselves”. When we compare a crowdfunding investor with an investment agent with years 
of investment experience, the actual need for information for these two investors are vastly 
different. 
The information disclosure regime in EU is also mostly been attributed by investors’ 
protection.210 As it is impossible to evaluate every investors’ need for information separately, 
the legislator has introduced specific thresholds in order to determine whether an investor is a 
retail investor, thus needs more information, or a professional investor. Under MiFID I regime, 
qualified investors211 and eligible counterparties212 are distinguished from retail investors. 
Generally, for retail investors higher standards of protection measures have been introduced. 
For example, the prospectus directive is not applicable when the offer is made solely to 
professional clients as these clients are able to fend for themselves. Despite the general rule that 
distinguishes qualified and retail investors and requires certain disclosure only to retail 
investors, some exceptions have been introduced in order to not to burden issuers with too strict 
administrative rules and therefore disproportionately restrict the business activities. The aim of 
these rules is to find a right balance between investor protection and facilitation of access to 
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capital markets. The disclosure regime should not be excessively burdensome to issuers but 
should be sufficient to protect investors according to their need for protection. 
One of the purposes of regulating information disclosure in regulated markets is to improve the 
quality of information disclosed and thereby preserve investors’ confidence in financial market. 
The same objectives should be achieved on crowdfunding secondary markets. Information 
asymmetries may be particularly high in young start-up companies due to the uncertainties and 
high risk with these investments.213 Therefore, the risk of information asymmetries in 
crowdfunding secondary markets may be even higher than in the companies whose shares are 
traded on regulated markets. Moreover, companies with small capitalisations are deemed to 
present disappropriate risks for both business failure and fraud.214 Adequate disclosure of 
information helps to protect investors and avoid market abuse, thereby increasing investors’ 
confidence into these markets215 and raising the crowdfunding secondary markets’ liquidity. 
The arguments against mandatory disclosure in small unlisted companies often concern the 
specific structure of smaller enterprises. From the existing shareholders’ point of view, the 
information disclosure is deemed less likely to be needed in private companies as shareholders 
learn about the business because they are managers, employees, or close observers in the firms 
in which they invest.216 This is, however, different in crowdfunded companies where the 
funding investors are strongly distinguished from the managers and controlling shareholders. 
Crowdfunding investors and shareholders generally are not close to the company managers and 
are not involved in company’s everyday business. Mandatory disclosure obligation to the 
companies would ensure that these minority shareholders are sufficiently informed and would 
avoid opportunistic behaviour of the managers and controlling shareholders.  
It is also argued that mandatory disclosure may increase economic growth of a company. It is 
an essential element in protecting company’s investors and creditors which plays an important 
role in any financial markets. Although most of the studies, conducted in this question, 
concentrate on public companies trading in stock market, similar claims could be made also 
about companies whose shares are traded on alternative trading venues or over-the-counter. The 
volume of the credit in economy depends largely on the information available to the debtors. 
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Empirical evidences have shown that the volume of credit grows when banks share more 
information on debtors and when the quality of credit registers improves.217 The publication of 
accounts allows improved assessment of credit risk for both individual transactions and bank 
and macroeconomic regulation.218 Therefore, improved information disclosure may advance 
the crowdfunding companies by making it easier to collect credit from new investors. 
Moreover, it is claimed that small companies may even benefit from mandatory disclosure 
systems than large or even medium size companies. This is mainly because the size of large 
firms makes them sensible for financial analysts and even press spend more for monitoring and 
analysing these companies’ activities. Moreover, large companies deal often with many 
contractual parties and those act also as information networks. Small companies, as 
crowdfunded start-ups, are generally unknown outside of their small cycle.219 This makes these 
companies higher risk investments220 than large companies and higher level of mandatory 
information disclosure would be an essential means for investors to evaluate these companies. 
Investors would be more confident to invest in these companies and the investment’s volume 
would raise. Therefore, it can be concluded that the investors need for information in 
crowdfunding secondary markets is similar as in regulated markets. Crowdfunding investors 
may be vulnerable to exploitation by business managers and dominant shareholders and if let 
uncontrolled, crowdfunding may likely become a possible place for frauds and exploitation of 
retail investors. Moreover, crowdfunding investors need to have sufficient information 
available for making informed and reasonable investment decisions. For these reasons, 
crowdfunding secondary markets should be subject to market abuse regime as well as the 
mandatory information disclosure regime. 
Under market abuse regime the issuers are required to disclose inside information and maintain 
insider lists, which would be an important means on crowdfunding markets to reduce insider 
trading and manipulation of the securities’ prices. The core aim of market abuse regime is to 
protect market integrity and eliminate unlawful behaviour on financial markets. Such objectives 
should also be achieved on crowdfunding secondary markets. 
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In addition, the issuers should be subject to the minimum disclosure regime under Transparency 
Directive. The disclosure regime consists of yearly and half-yearly information disclosure as 
well as on-going information on major holdings of voting rights. The yearly and half-yearly 
reports give the investors a comprehensive overview of the company’s activity and provides 
the investors with adequate and updated information for making reasonable investment 
decisions. The information disclosure helps to achieve more transparent markets, thereby 
providing better investor protection and contributes to formation of fair price. However, if we 
apply on crowdfunding secondary markets similar disclosure requirements as on regulated 
markets, it may add extensive administrative burden and costs to the small companies that are 
typically financed by crowdfunding. Consequently, too rigid information disclosure 
requirements may eliminate the whole crowdfunding secondary markets and adversary affect 
the economy. When similar information disclosure requirements apply to all companies, it is 
clear that the same expenses that big companies could spend on information disclosure, would 
be substantially more burdensome for small companies. As a result, the small companies rather 
invest in restructuring the companies in order to avoid these requirements or even give up 
offering the securities to retail investors.  
First, the full disclosure regime under Transparency Directive may be excessively burdensome 
to crowdfunded companies. The cost of information disclosure may be disproportionately high, 
considering the low cost of the crowdfunding securities and therefore lower risks that the 
investors take when investing through crowdfunding platforms. The author of the current thesis 
is in opinion that the format of current reporting requirements for companies on regulated 
markets is excessively stringent for crowdfunded companies. Although, crowdfunding 
secondary markets should be, in principle, subject to similar periodic information disclosure as 
regulated under the Transparency Directive, specific “lighter” version of the disclosure 
obligations should be introduced for crowdfunding secondary markets. This regime must, inter 
alia, include balance sheet, income statement, cash flow and changes in equity capital but these 
statements should be provided in shorter version. 
Second, the shorter version of prospectus disclosure requirement should be introduced for 
crowdfunding. Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets 
Union Jonathan Hill has emphasized the need for prospectus regime that gives the investors the 
information they need but at the same time admitted the importance of a balanced regulation 
that would not pile up unnecessary costs and put companies off raising money on the public 
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markets.221 The main concern of European Commission was that at the moment the prospectus 
requirement is acting as unnecessary barrier for SMEs to access public markets and raise 
capital.222. In order to promote SME market, on European Commission has proposed special 
regulations for SMEs. A new “question and answer” format prospectus for SMEs will be 
introduced223 in order to lower administrative burden from those companies and facilitate 
capital raising. 
This new regime would be specifically defined as a “SME market” regime in the framework 
directive and would set out requirements that are proportionate and tailored to take into account 
specific nature and needs of these markets. The criteria of “SME market” would set forth some 
specific thresholds and market capitalisation for such companies. With the new prospectus 
regime the Commission proposed to include into the existing framework directive, inter alia, 
detailed requirements applying to operator of the SME market, eligibility conditions for issuers 
to be traded on the SME market, the need for an admission document and audited annual report 
for SMEs on the market, pre- and post-trade transparency requirements and the specific 
requirements for monitoring trading on the market operator to ensure fair and orderly trading 
and to detect market abuse such as insider trading and market manipulation.224  
The main objective of the amendment of the current prospectus regime is to make easier and 
cheaper for smaller companies to access capital markets and to provide simplified and flexible 
conditions for these companies on secondary markets. It is important to find the right balance 
between market transparency and protecting legitimate interests of the market participants. The 
current regime provides very rigid and “one-fits-all” type of disclosure requirements. This 
restricts small companies’ access to capital markets as the disclosure of information is 
disproportionately expensive and burdensome for these companies. In order to avoid these 
excessive expenses, the companies are searching for solutions how to structure the business in 
a way that exempts them from these disclosure requirements. As a result, none of the objectives 
of effective capital market would be fulfilled. First, companies are facing excessive expenses 
to avoid even higher disclosure costs and their access to markets is limited, and second, as the 
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companies are avoiding being subject to disclosure requirements, the retail investors will not 
receive adequate information. This is especially problematic in crowdfunding business because 
the general level of investment knowledge of crowdfunding investors is low and these investors 
are particularly vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. These investors should be 
provided with at least minimum information that is disclosed to them in simple and 
understandable way.  
Therefore, the author is in opinion that special disclosure regime under Transparency Directive 
as well as the special light prospectus regime as proposed by European Commission, would the 
best solutions for achieving more transparent and efficient crowdfunding markets while at the 
same time protecting crowdfunding investors in these markets.  This specific disclosure regime 
for crowdfunding secondary markets would, however, first need a specific regulatory regime 
for crowdfunding primary markets in Estonia, as it is regulated in many other countries (e.g. 
the regulations in United States, Italy and Germany more specifically analysed in the first 
chapter). In particular, the concept of investment-based crowdfunding should be defined under 
law, registration requirement for investment-based crowdfunding platforms should be 
introduced and these crowdfunding platforms should be under the supervision of Estonian 
Financial Supervision Authority (Finantsinspektsioon). Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
distinguish investment-based crowdfunding platforms from other similar structures and the 
requirements of lower information disclosure may be misused. Moreover, regulating 
investment-based crowdfunding primary markets would lower the risks also on secondary 
markets and would reduce the risk of potential damages for investors (e.g. by imposing 
maximum investment limits per investor, imposing the investment limits that depend on the 
income of the investor or requiring that a certain percentage of investments must be made by 
professional investors). 
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CONCLUSION 
Crowdfunding is an activity of pooling money in small individual contributions from group of 
people, who are typically not professional investors, in order to support someone’s idea and to 
accomplish a specific goal. Investment-based crowdfunding allows business owners to source 
investments for their young companies by offering equity in the business. Crowdfunding would 
be an important means for start-ups and young companies to find funding for their ideas, thereby 
helping to create new jobs and stimulate the economy in general.   
In Estonia, the investment-based crowdfunding is not under supervision of Financial 
Supervision Authority (Finantsinspektsioon) and the online platforms are currently not required 
to hold any licence and no other prerequisites are established for such portal operators. 
Moreover, there are no special protection measures, such as investment limits or wealth-based 
investment allowance, special risk warning requirements, established for retail investors. 
Therefore, the possibility for frauds and wrong assessment of risks by non-experienced 
crowdfunding investors is high. Besides, current legal uncertainty is a major obstacle for 
development of crowdfunding business and especially it is a barrier for foreign crowdfunding 
platforms providing cross-border services or establishing a branch in Estonia. Estonia needs to 
take the initiative to reassess the current legal framework in the light of the changed reality that 
crowdfunding has caused and find the reasonable compromise between adequate retail investor 
protection and the objective to encourage the growth of start-ups businesses through 
investment-based crowdfunding. These issues should be addressed in both primary and 
secondary markets. 
One of the biggest risk for crowdfunding investors investing in start-up companies is the lack 
of liquidity of these investments. It may take many years until the first liquidity events in a 
company and when the investors would have any possibility to gain revenues from their 
investments. Addressing this problem, several crowdfunding platforms have recently created 
special secondary trading venues for crowdfunding investors. These so-called crowdfunding 
secondary markets give the young companies a possibility to list their shares or share quotas on 
alternative trading venues that do not require these companies to fulfil very high requirements 
as regulated markets do. This leads to a question, whether investors on such crowdfunding 
secondary markets are sufficiently protected, considering that the information disclosure 
requirements may not apply or be lower than on regulated markets. 
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With the current thesis, the author tried to find an answer to the question, what the sufficient 
information disclosure would be and whether the current company law and securities law 
provide for sufficient protection for investors in crowdfunding secondary markets.  
Crowdfunding secondary markets could be structured on exchange trading venues (multilateral 
trading facilities) or over-the-counter. The information disclosure regime on regulated markets 
and on such crowdfunding secondary markets is vastly different. The companies, whose 
securities are admitted to regulated markets, are subject to disclosure requirements under 
Prospectus Directive, Transparency Directive and Market Abuse Directive. When securities are 
traded outside of regulated markets, such disclosure requirements are generally not applicable. 
However, under the Market Abuse Directive II and Market Abuse Regulation, which will enter 
into force on 3nd July 2016 will widen the scope also to financial instruments traded on MTFs 
or over-the-counter. Therefore, under the new market abuse regime, regulated markets and 
crowdfunding secondary markets will be subject to similar inside information disclosure. 
Assuming that the disclosure requirements that are applicable to regulated markets, are not 
applicable to crowdfunding secondary markets, the sufficiency of the information disclosure 
requirements under Estonian company law, in order to protect investors on crowdfunding 
secondary markets, was analysed. The author found that the disclosure requirements in non-
listed companies are aimed to protect the interests of the existing shareholders and promote 
corporate governance and this information disclosure is not protecting the potential investors 
from market abuse or contributing to formation of fair price or helping crowdfunding investors 
to make informed investment decisions. The information is directed to the shareholders not to 
general public or third persons. Moreover, individuals who do not have a shareholder’s legal 
status are not granted with a right to require any information disclosure. Thus, if the disclosure 
requirements that are applicable to regulated markets, are not applicable to crowdfunding 
secondary markets, the disclosure requirements under Estonian company law are not sufficient 
to provide adequate protection to crowdfunding investors because these information disclosure 
requirements would not be sufficient to protect investors, provide transparent crowdfunding 
secondary markets and promote efficiency in these markets. 
Assuming that the disclosure requirements applicable to regulated markets would be fully 
applicable to crowdfunding secondary markets, the author analysed whether these requirements 
would be proportionate on crowdfunding secondary markets. From one side, it is important that 
the potential advantages that crowdfunding would give to young companies, would not be 
excessively limited by rigid administrative and information disclosure regime imposed by state. 
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When the information disclosure requirements are too expensive and burdensome for the 
issuers, they would lose their motivations of listing the securities on the crowdfunding 
secondary markets. As the success of primary crowdfunding market depends highly on the 
functioning of secondary markets, it may undermine the potential that crowdfunding would 
give for financing young start-ups and consequently to economy as a whole. From the other 
side, despite all benefits that supporting financing young start-ups would give to our economy, 
the most important task of a state is to assure that investors participating in such funding are 
adequately protected and that these markets are functioning honestly without fraudulent 
activities and exploitation of retail investors. Crowdfunding investors are mainly 
unsophisticated retail investors without having any or having very few knowledge and 
experience in investing, and therefore, higher protection standards should be granted to these 
investors. 
Information disclosure helps also to achieve more efficient crowdfunding secondary markets 
by increasing investors’ confidence and trust into such markets. One of the most important 
means for promoting investors’ confidence into the market is the requirement to disclose 
information which would give the investors a possibility to assess potential risks and rewards 
of their investments and thereby help them to protect their own interests. Disclosure regulation 
ensures the dissemination of financial information that otherwise would not be made available 
to the investors as well as it allows public opinion (e.g. media) to promote discussion of the 
data and open discussions on issuer’s performance. This information could not be disclosed 
solely on voluntarily basis under free market forces as due to information asymmetries and 
possible market abuses, the efficiency of these markets would be very low. Considering the 
general nature and small size of crowdfunding investments, it would be unreasonable to require 
crowdfunding investors to conduct independent financial analyses of these companies. When 
the investors are not sufficiently informed and they would need to make additional expenses to 
collect the information by themselves, the investors would not be attracted by the crowdfunding 
securities as these markets would be too risky and expensive. 
Crowdfunding secondary markets efficiency may be undermined by fraudulent activities in the 
market, such as market manipulation or insider trading. Market manipulation involves 
interference with the market’s normal price-forming mechanism and thereby it undermines the 
efficiency, credibility and integrity of the market. As a result investors will lose their trust in 
such financial markets and will eventually give up investing or will invest in different sources. 
Insider trading is considered to cause an adverse selection problem and therefore low liquidity, 
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low prices, large bid ask spreads, high cost of capital and market breakdown under some 
conditions.  Outside investors would lose their confidence and invest less. 
According to Article 52 of the CFREU, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to 
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. Private companies are considered to have higher 
protection of private property and data. Requiring the same information disclosure from private 
companies as it is required for the companies whose shares are listed on regulated markets 
would be disappropriate as it would be excessively restricting these companies’ rights for 
privacy and freedom of business. When a company goes public, it will be in a certain position 
in which they are required to provide adequate level of information to investors in order to 
achieve transparency and efficiency of the financial markets. The author of the current thesis is 
in opinion that the same principles should be applicable when the securities are traded on 
crowdfunding secondary markets as the company cannot be considered as private anymore and 
the investors’ need for information is similar as on regulated markets. High level of consumer 
protection as one of the most important policy in all EU capital markets, and should be provided 
to customers regardless of the market structure or operator. 
Information disclosure requirements should reflect the investors’ actual need for information. 
The disclosure regime should not be excessively burdensome to issuers but should be sufficient 
to protect investors according to their need for protection. One of the purposes of regulating 
information disclosure in regulated markets is to improve the quality of information disclosed 
and thereby preserve investors’ confidence in financial market. The same objectives should be 
achieved on crowdfunding secondary markets. Information asymmetries may be particularly 
high in young start-up companies due to the uncertainties and high risk with these investments. 
The risk of information asymmetries in crowdfunding secondary markets may be even higher 
than in the companies whose shares are traded on regulated markets. Crowdfunding investors 
need to have sufficient information available for making informed and reasonable investment 
decisions.  
Under market abuse regime the issuers are required to disclose inside information and maintain 
insider lists, which would be an important means on crowdfunding markets to reduce insider 
trading and manipulation of the securities prices. The core aim of market abuse regime is to 
protect market integrity and eliminate unlawful behaviour on financial markets. Such objectives 
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should also be achieved on crowdfunding secondary markets. Therefore, the crowdfunding 
secondary markets should be subject to similar market abuse disclosure regime as regulated 
markets. 
Regarding the periodic information disclosure under the Transparency Directive, the author is 
in opinion that the format of current reporting requirements for companies on regulated markets 
is excessively burdensome for crowdfunding secondary markets. Although, crowdfunding 
secondary markets should be, in principle, subject to similar periodic information disclosure as 
regulated markets, specific “lighter” version of the disclosure obligations should be introduced 
for crowdfunding secondary markets. The full disclosure regime under Transparency Directive 
may be excessively expensive to crowdfunded companies; the cost of information disclosure 
may be disproportionately high, considering the low cost of the crowdfunding securities and 
therefore lower risks that the investors take when investing through crowdfunding platforms.  
Moreover, the author found in the current thesis that, in order to avoid imposing too burdensome 
and expensive disclosure requirements for issuers on crowdfunding markets, the SMEs should 
be subject to proportionate prospectus regime. A new “question and answer” format prospectus 
regime for SMEs, as it has been previously proposed by European Commission, would be 
necessary to reduce administrative burden and expenses for SMEs on crowdfunding secondary 
markets. This prospectus would provide the investors with necessary information in simple and 
understandable way, helping these investors to make informed investment decisions enabling 
the investors to understand the main risks arising from investments in crowdfunding securities. 
The author is in opinion that abolition of the prospectus requirement for crowdfunding would 
not be a right option for facilitating capital raising through crowdfunding as this would leave 
investors without adequate protection. The special SME market prospectus, however, would be 
one of the solution for achieving more transparent and efficient crowdfunding markets while at 
the same time it would provide sufficient information for crowdfunding investors, helping these 
investors to make informed investment decisions enabling the investors to understand the main 
risks arising from investments in crowdfunding securities. 
This specific disclosure regime for crowdfunding secondary markets would, however, first need 
a specific regulatory regime for crowdfunding primary markets in Estonia. In particular, the 
concept of investment-based crowdfunding should be defined under law, registration 
requirement for investment-based crowdfunding platforms should be introduced and these 
crowdfunding platforms should be under the supervision of Estonian Financial Supervision 
Authority (Finantsinspektsioon). Otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish investment-
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based crowdfunding platforms from other similar structures and the requirements of lower 
information disclosure may be misused. Moreover, regulating investment-based crowdfunding 
primary markets would lower the risks also on secondary markets and would reduce the risk of 
potential damages for investors (e.g. imposing maximum investment limits per investor). 
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INVESTORITE KAITSE ÜHISRAHASTAMISE JÄRELTURUL: 
PROPORTSIONAALNE INFORMATSIOONI AVALDAMISE KOHUSTUS 
Resümee 
Ühisrahastamine ehk crowdfunding tähendab (väikeste) investeeringute kogumist paljudelt 
üksikisikutelt, kes ei ole tavaliselt professionaalsed investorid,  eesmärgiga toetada mingit ideed 
või saavutada teatud eesmärk. Investeeringutel põhinev ühisrahastamine tähendab ettevõtte 
rahastamist läbi spetsiaalse veebipõhise ühisrahastamise platvormi, mille käigus eraisikud 
saavad investeerida väikeseid summasid noortesse ettevõtetesse ja omandavad seeläbi osaluse 
vastavas ettevõttes.  
Ühisrahastamine on maailmas üha enam populaarsust koguv noorte ettevõtete 
finantseerimisviis. Kõige enam ühisrahastamise platvorme tegutseb USA-s, kus esimesed loodi 
juba 2005. aastal. Euroopas hakkas ühisrahastamine populaarsust koguma esimeste platvormide 
ilmumisega 2010. aastal. Mitmed riigid (nt Saksamaa, Itaalia, Suurbritannia, Prantsusmaa, 
USA) on peamiselt investorite kaitse eesmärgiga loonud riigisisese ühisrahastamise 
regulatsiooni. Eestis ei ole seadusandja sellist initsiatiivi veel üles näidanud, olgugi et Eestisse 
on viimastel aastatel loodud mitu investeerimispõhist ühisrahastamise platvormi ja Eesti 
ettevõtjad on muutumas järjest teadlikumaks sellisest rahastamisviisist. 
Investeerimispõhine ühisrahastamine on alternatiivne finantseerimisvahend ettevõtetele, kellel 
ei õnnestu finantseerida oma tegevust pankade ega riskikapitalifondide abiga. Samuti pakub 
ühisrahastamine ettevõttele aga vähem riskantsema ja lihtsama finantseerimise viisi võrreldes 
laenu võtmisega. Sellistes finantseerimistes osalevad inimesed ei ole tavaliselt professionaalsed 
investorid vaid üldjuhul väga vähese investeerimiskogemuse ja -teadmistega tarbijad. 
Ühisrahastamise teel omandavad investorid noortes arenguperspektiividega ettevõtetes osaluse, 
et ettevõtte hilisema arengu käigus kasumit teenida.  
Üheks suurimaks riskiks ühisrahastamise teel väärtpabereid omandanud investoritele on vähene 
(või puuduv) likviidsus. Esiteks ei teeni investorid iduettevõtetes või noortes ettevõtetes osalust 
omandades dividende ja esimene tulu teenimise võimalus võiks olla osaluse müümine. 
Dividendide maksmine otsustatakse osanike või aktsionäride koosolekul ja selliste otsuste 
vastuvõtmiseks on vajalik osanike või aktsionäride häälteenamus. Häälteenamus võib aga 
kuuluda ettevõtte dominantsetele aktsionäridele või osanikele ja seega puudub ühisrahastamise 
teel oma aktsiad või osad omandanud investoritel reaalne otsustusvõimalus. Lisaks on noorte 
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ettevõtete puhul tavaline, et kogu kasum investeeritakse ettevõttesse, et kiirendada ettevõtte 
võimalikult kiiret kasvu. Võib võtta palju aastaid enne kui investor võiks dividendide näol tulu 
teenida ning samas ei pruugi seda kunagi juhtuda. Sellisel juhul oleks esimene võimalus 
investoritel oma investeeringust tulu teenimiseks oma väärtpaberid müüa. 
Ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite vähese likviidsuse põhjuseks on eelkõige 
vastava spetsiaalse organiseeritud järelturu puudumine. Järelturu puudumine on samuti väga 
oluliseks takistuseks esmase turu arengule, sest investor, kes näeb, et tal puudub võimalus oma 
investeering temale sobival ajal välja võtta, või sellest reaalselt (lähi)tulevikus kasumit teenida, 
ei ole motiveeritud oma raha sellistesse projektidesse paigutama. Vastuseks turu vajadusele on 
Euroopas viimastel aastatel tekkinud mitmeid ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite 
järelturgu pakkuvaid platvorme, mis on organiseeritud väljaspool reguleeritud turgu. Seega 
saavad noored ettevõtted, kes on kapitali kogunud läbi ühisrahastamise platvormi, pakkuda oma 
investoritele võimalust väärtpaberitega kaubelda ilma, et need ettevõtted peaksid vastama 
rangetele reguleeritud turu nõuetele.  
Sellised ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite järelturud (edaspidi ainsuses: 
ühisrahastamise järelturg) võiksid luua ideaalse võimaluse, kuidas muuta ühisrahastamise teel 
omandatud väärtpaberid likviidsemaks ja pakkuda investoritele võimalusi investeeringutest 
varem väljuda ning tulu teenida. Esimesed ühisrahastamise järelturud on aga tekkinud alles 
väga hiljuti ja siiani puudub selle kohta akadeemiline arutelu, kuidas sellised järelturu 
platvormid peaksid olema reguleeritud, millised potentsiaalsed ohud tekivad investoritele 
ühisrahastamise järelturu platvormidel kauplemisel ning milline peaks olema piisav 
informatsiooni avaldamise kohustus investoritele. Ühelt poolt on oluline, et likviidsus, mida 
ühisrahastamise järelturg pakub noortele ettevõtetele, ei oleks takistatud riigi poolt sätestatud 
liialt rangete administratiivsete ja informatsiooni avaldamise nõuetega. Teiselt poolt on peaks 
riik tagama, et investorid, kes investeerivad taolistel platvormidel, oleks piisavalt kaitstud ja et 
sellised turud toimiksid ausalt, ilma petturlike ja kuritaktlike tegevusteta.  
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk on välja selgitada, millised peaksid olema eelkirjeldatud 
ühisrahastamise järelturul informatsiooni avaldamise nõuded, mis ühelt poolt ei takistaks liialt 
järelturgude arengut ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberitele, kuid teiselt poolt 
pakuksid investoritele piisavalt kaitset ja aitaksid vältida turukuritarvitusi ja muid pettusi 
sellistel turgudel.  
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Autor püstitab kaks hüpoteesi: 
1) kui informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused, mis kohalduvad reguleeritud turgudele, ei 
kohaldu ühisrahastamise järelturgudele, siis muud avaldamiskohustused, mis tulenevad 
äriseadustikust, ei paku piisavat kaitset investoritele ühisrahastamise järelturul; 
2) kui informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused, mis kohalduvad reguleeritud turgudele, 
kohalduvad täielikult ka ühisrahastamise järelturule, siis sellised informatsiooni avaldamise 
kohustused on ülemäära koormavad ühisrahastamise järelturul.  
Seega peaks ühisrahastamise järelturul kohalduma spetsiifiline informatsiooni avaldamise 
režiim, mis võtaks arvesse ühisrahastamise turgude eripära ja ei oleks sellistele ettevõtetele liialt 
koormavad, kuid samal ajal pakuksid piisavalt kaitset investoritele. 
Kontrollimaks esitatud hüpoteese, selgitas autor kõigepealt investeerimispõhise 
ühisrahastamise ja selle järelturu üldist kontseptsiooni ning õiguslikku raamistikku. 
Ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite järelturgu mõjutab oluliselt esmase turu olemus 
ja regulatsioon. Hetkel puudub ühisrahastamise esmase turu harmoneeritud regulatsioon 
Euroopa Liidus, mistõttu on reeglistik Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides väga killustunud. Mõned 
Euroopa riigid on võtnud vastu  täpsed ühisrahastamise tegevust puudutavad regulatsioonid 
samas ajal kui mitmetes teistes riikides on kogu ühisrahastamise kontseptsioon jätkuvalt 
reguleerimata. Kuna Eesti kuulub teise nimetatud riikide gruppi, siis on töös võrdlusena uuritud 
kahe teise Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigi – Itaalia ja Saksamaa – ning ühisrahastamise ja vastavate 
regulatsioonide sünnikohariigi USA õiguslikku raamistikku ja analüüsitud, kas Eesti vajaks 
investeerimispõhise ühisrahastamise reguleerimist, et tagada tõhusam (jae)investorite kaitse 
ja/või lihtsustada ühisrahastamise teel noorte ettevõtete rahastamist. Leitud on, et Eesti vajaks 
vastavat õiguslikku raamistikku, mis reguleeriks investeerimispõhiste ühisrahastamise 
platvormide tegevust eelkõige tagamaks tõhusam kaitse investoritele.  
Kontrollimaks, millised informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused oleksid kohalduvad 
ühisrahastamise järelturul, analüüsib autor esimeses peatükis erinevate kauplemissüsteemide 
sobivust ja börsivälise kauplemise regulatsiooni kohaldamist ühisrahastamise järelturule. 
Leitud on, et ühisrahastamise teel omandatud järelturg võiks olla praeguses õiguslikus 
raamistikus organiseeritud nii mitmepoolsetel kauplemissüsteemidel (multilateral trading 
facilities) kui ka börsiväliselt (over-the-counter). Börsivälise kauplemise puhul peaks aga 
investeerimisühing, mis tegutseb süsteemse täitjana (systematic internaliser), vastama 
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täiendavatele kauplemiseelsetele läbipaistvusnõuetele, mis tavalise börsivälise kauplemise 
puhul ei kohaldu. 
Teises peatükis selgitab autor välja, kas juhul kui ühisrahastamise järelturul ei kohalduks 
reguleeritud turgudel kohalduvad informatsiooni avaldamise nõuded, oleksid äriseadustikust 
tulenevad informatsiooni avaldamise nõuded piisavad, et tagada investorite piisav kaitse 
ühisrahastatud ettevõtetes. Autor analüüsib kõigepealt informatsiooni avaldamise eesmärke 
ühisrahastamise järelturul, leides, et peamised eesmärgid on saavutada turu läbipaistvus ja 
efektiivsus. Turu läbipaistvus tagab muuhulgas investorite kaitse ja hoiab ära ebaseaduslikud 
tegevused turul. Turu efektiivsus on oluline piisava likviidsuse tagamiseks ja ühisrahastamise 
turu arengus, mis omakorda aitab elavdada majandust. Informatsiooni avaldamise peamine 
eesmärk ettevõtetes väljaspool reguleeritud turgu on aga pigem pakkuda äriühingu 
aktsionäridele või osanikele võimalus oma õiguste teostamiseks ettevõttes (nt hääleõigus, 
vähemusaktsionäride õigused). Seega on reguleeritud turgudel informatsiooni avaldamise 
eesmärgid laiemad. Informatsiooni avaldamise kohustuse subjektideks on nii olemasolevad 
aktsionärid või osanikud, aga ka potentsiaalsed investorid. Informatsiooni avaldamine aitab 
seega kaasa hea ühingujuhtimise tagamisele kui ka pakub investoritele võimalust hinnata 
väärtpaberite väärtust ettevõttes teha seega informeeritud investeerimisotsuseid. Kuna 
äriseadustik sätestab pigem aktsionäride ja osanike informeerimiskohustuse ja selline 
informatsiooni avaldamise kohustus ei ole suunatud investoritele investeerimisotsuste 
tegemiseks ega turu kuritarvitamise ärahoidmiseks, siis ei ole selline informatsiooni avaldamise 
kohustus piisav, et tagada turu läbipaistvus ja piisav turu efektiivsus. Seetõttu peaks 
ühisrahastamise järelturul kohalduma ulatuslikumad informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused. 
Kolmandas peatükis analüüsib autor, kas juhul kui eeldada, et ühisrahastamise järelturul 
kohalduvad sarnased informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused nagu reguleeritud turgudel, oleksid 
sellised informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused proportsionaalsed, võttes arvesse 
ühisrahastamise turu võimalikke iseärasusi. Autori eesmärk on välja selgitada, milline peaks 
olema proportsionaalne informatsiooni avaldamise kohustuse nõue ühisrahastamise järelturul. 
Esiteks on analüüsitud, kas informatsiooni avaldamise kohustuse reguleerimine riigi poolt on 
ühisrahastamise järelturul vajalik või võiks selline informatsiooni avaldamine olla reguleeritud 
vaba turu tingimuses. Kui eeldada finantsturu osaliste ratsionaalset käitumist, siis peaks vaba 
turu tingimuses informatsiooni nõudlus ja pakkumine jõudma tasakaalupunktini, milles emitent 
avaldab täpselt niipalju informatsiooni, mida investor investeerimisotsuse tegemiseks vajab. 
Teiste sõnadega oleks tegemist sellise tasakaalupunktiga, milles iga järgnev ühik 
informatsiooni oleks kallim kui sellest saadav kasu. Võimalike turutõrgete tõttu ei ole aga 
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taoline tasakaal ühisrahastamise järelturgudel võimalik. Informatsiooni asümmeetria ja  
võimalike turukuritarvituste tõttu oleks sellise turu efektiivsus väga madal. Arvestades 
ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite väikest väärtust, siis oleks ebamõistlik eeldada 
ühisrahastamise investoritelt iseseisvat turuanalüüsi.  
Siiski ei saa investori informatsiooni avaldamise kohustus olla piiranguteta. Ühelt poolt 
igasugune informatsiooni avaldamise kohustus piirab ettevõtte tegevusvabadust ja ärisaladusi. 
Teiselt poolt on piisav informatsiooni avaldamine vajalik, et tagada adekvaatne investorite 
kaitse. Vastavalt Euroopa Liidu Põhiõiguste Harta artiklile 52 peab hartaga tunnustatud õiguste 
ja vabaduste teostamist tohib piirata ainult seadusega ning arvestades nimetatud õiguste ja 
vabaduste olemust. Proportsionaalsuse põhimõtte kohaselt võib piiranguid seada üksnes juhul, 
kui need on vajalikud ning vastavad tegelikult liidu poolt tunnustatud üldist huvi pakkuvatele 
eesmärkidele või kui on vaja kaitsta teiste isikute õigusi ja vabadusi. 
Üldiselt on ettevõtetel reguleeritud turgudel tagatud mõnevõrra madalam eraomandi ja 
ärisaladuste kaitse. Ebaproportsionaalne oleks nõuda eraettevõtetelt samasugust informatsiooni 
avaldamise kohustust kui noteeritud ettevõtetelt. Kui ettevõtte väärtpaberid noteeritakse, siis 
võtab ettevõte teatud positsiooni, mis nõuab täiendavaid kohustusi investorite ees. Riik peab 
tagama, et reguleeritud turgudel oleksid investorid piisavalt informeeritud ning oskaksid 
hinnata investeerimisriske ning hoida ära kuritahtlikud ning petturlikud tegevused ja 
kindlustama turu aus toimimine. Käesoleva töö autor on seisukohal, et kuivõrd investorid 
ühisrahastamise järelturul on samasuguses positsioonis kui reguleeritud turu osalised ja nende 
investorite informatsioonivajadus on sarnane, siis tuleks neile investoritele ka tagada sarnane 
kaitse. Kõrgetasemeline investorite kaitse on üks kõige olulisemaid põhimõtteid 
kapitaliturgudel ja see peaks olema tagatud investoritele olenemata turu struktuurist või 
operaatorist. 
Lisaks peaksid informatsiooni avaldamise nõuded peegeldama investorite tegelikku 
informatsioonivajadust. Ebakindluse ja kõrge riski tõttu võib informatsiooni asümmeetria olla 
noortes iduettevõtetes eriti kõrge. Samuti on investorid, kes investeerivad noortesse 
ettevõtetesse läbi ühisrahastamise platvormide üldiselt investeerimisteadmiste ja -kogemusteta 
tarbijad, kelle suhtes on eriti kõrge pettuste oht. Näiteks on oht, et investoritelt kaasatakse raha 
ettevõtete rahastamiseks, kuid samal ajal jäetakse nad ilma õigustest, mis üldiselt osanikele või 
aktsionäridele ettevõttes peaks kuuluma. Samas tuleks aga arvestada ka sellega, väikestes ja 
keskmise suurusega ettevõtetes võivad olla reguleeritud turgudega sarnased informatsiooni 
avaldamise kohustused liialt koormavad ja kulukad. Sellised kohustused võiksid pärssida 
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ettevõtete kapitali kaasamist ning järelturul likviidsuse pakkumist investoritele. Arvestades 
investeeringute üldiselt väga väikesi väärtusi ühisrahastamise järelturul, ei oleks 
proportsionaalne nõuda sellisel turgudel võrdset informatsiooni avaldamist kui reguleeritud 
turgudel. Seega on käesoleva töö autor seisukohal, et ühisrahastamise järelturul peaksid 
kohalduma spetsiifilised informatsiooni avaldamise kohustused, mis oleksid vähem koormavad 
kui reguleeritud turgudele kohalduvad avaldamisnõuded, kuid samas pakuksid investoritele 
ühisrahastamise järelturul piisavat kaitset.  
Esiteks peaks ühisrahastamise teel omandatud väärtpaberite järelturul kohalduma 
turukuritarvitamise regulatsioonist tulenevad avaldamisnõuded. Kui informatsiooni 
avaldamine ühisrahastamise järelturul ei ole reguleeritud, siis võib tekkida kõrge oht 
turumanipulatsiooniks ja siseringi tehinguteks. Lisaks on risk, et ilma adekvaatse 
informatsiooni avaldamiseta jaeinvestorid ei suudaks hinnata investeerimisriske, mis tekivad 
ühisrahastamise järelturul.  
Teiseks, seoses läbipaistvusdirektiivist tulenevate avaldamisnõuetega, on käesoleva töö autor 
seisukohal, et ühisrahastamise järelturul tuleks kehtestata spetsiifilised perioodilise 
finantsinformatsiooni avaldamise nõuded. Üldiselt peaksid läbipaistvusdirektiivist tulenevad 
avaldamisnõuded olema kohalduvad ka ühisrahastamise järelturul (nt bilansiaruanne, 
kasumiaruanne, rahavood ja muutused osakapitalis), kuid need nõuded peaksid olema 
madalamad ja informatsiooni esitamise vorm peaks olema lihtsustatum. Reguleeritud turgudele 
kohalduvad nõuded on käesoleva töö autori hinnangul liialt kulukad ja koormavad 
ühisrahastamise järelturul, arvestades ühisrahastatud ettevõtete suurust ja nende väärtpaberite 
väga väikest väärtust. Perioodilised finantsinformatsiooni avaldamise nõuete kohaldamine on 
aga oluline, kuivõrd need annavad investoritele adekvaatse ja uuendatud teave ettevõtte 
olukorrast ja pakuvad seega investoritele täieliku ülevaate ettevõtte tegevusest. Selline teave on 
oluline tegemaks mõistlikke investeerimisotsuseid ja hindamaks finantsriske. Informatsiooni 
avaldamine aitab luua läbipaistvamad kapitaliturud, luua efektiivsema investorite kaitse 
mehhanismi ja aidata kaasa õiglase hinna kujunemisele. Lisaks suurendab see investorite 
usaldust turgu ja aitab seega luua ka efektiivsema ühisrahastamise järelturu toimimise. 
Lisaks leiab autor käesolevas töös, et ühisrahastamise väärtpabereid avalikkusele pakkuvatele 
väikestele ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtetele peaks kohalduma lihtsustatud prospektinõue. 
Praegusel hetkel kehtib ühesugune prospektinõue  kõikidele ettevõteteleolenemata ettevõtte 
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suurusest.225  Prospekti koostamine võib aga olla ebaproportsionaalselt kulukas väikestele 
ettevõtetele ja pärssida  nende ettevõtete kapitali kaasamist läbi ühisrahastamise. Uus „küsimus-
vastus“ vormis lihtsustatud prospekt, nagu eelnevalt välja pakutud Euroopa Komisjoni poolt, 
oleks vajalik, et vähendada väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtete administratiivset 
koormust ja kulutusi informatsiooni avaldamisele. Selline prospekt teeks investoritele vajaliku 
informatsiooni kättesaadavaks lihtsas ja arusaadavas vormis, aidates investoritel teha 
mõistlikke ja informeeritud investeerimisotsuseid ja aru saada riskidest, mis sellistesse 
väärtpaberitesse investeerimine endaga kaasa toob. Prospektinõude täielik kaotamine 
ühisrahastamise puhul poleks käesoleva töö autori hinnangul õigustatud kuna sellisel juhul ei 
oleks tagatud piisav investorite informeerimine, mis tagaks investorite adekvaatse kaitse. 
Eelpoolkirjeldatud spetsiifiliste avaldamisnõuete režiimi kehtestamine ühisrahastamise 
järelturule nõuaks aga autori hinnangul kõigepealt ühisrahastamise esmase turu reguleerimist, 
s.t. eelkõige investeerimispõhise ühisrahastamise seaduses defineerimist, ühisrahastamise 
platvormi registreerimist ja Finantsinspektsiooni kontrolli alla viimist. Vastasel juhul oleks 
keeruline eristada investeerimispõhiseid ühisrahastamise platvorme muudest sarnastest 
struktuuridest ja madalamaid avaldamisnõudeid võidaks kuritarvitada muudel eesmärkidel. 
Lisaks vähendaks ühisrahastamise esmase turu reguleerimine riske ja vähendaks investoritele 
kahju tekkimise võimalust (nt läbi maksimaalsete investeerimispiirangute sätestamise).
                                                 
225 Eeldusel, et väärtpabereid pakutakse reguleeritud turul või üle teatud piirmäära, mille puhul on tegemist avaliku 
pakkumisega (Väärtpaberituru seadus § 12 lg 2). 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
  
CONSOB Public authority responsible for regulating the Italian financial markets 
(Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) 
CC Estonian Commercial Code 
ESMA The European Securities and Markets Authority 
IOSCO The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IPO Initial public offering 
JOBS Act Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
MiFID I Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I (Directive 2004/39/EC) 
MiFID II Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (Directive 2014/65/EU) 
MiFIR Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 
600/2014) 
MTF Multilateral Trading Facility 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTF Online Trading Facility 
PIEIA Estonian Payment Institutions and E-money Institutions Act 
SEC U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
SMA Estonian Securities Market Act 
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